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Acehnese activist sadistically murdered 
One of Aceh 's foremost human rights activists, Jafar Siddiq Hamzah was abducted and brutally 
murdered white on a visit to Medan, North Sumatra. This tragedy has once again focused on the 
dangerous conditions in which human rights defenders function in Aceh. Security forces in Medan 
refused to conduct investigations into his abduction despite international pressure and protest. 
Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, 34, was chair of the New York-based 
International Forum on Aceh which he founded in 1998. The 
IFA took the initiative to convene a number of international 
meetings to help set up an international network of solidarity 
for Aceh, and draw the attention of the international commu-
nity to the grave human rights situation that has existed in Aceh 
since the late 1980s. 
Jafar had only recently returned to Aceh after deciding to 
take time off from his studies in the US for a few months to 
devote his efforts to building an effective link between the 
human rights network in Aceh and international human rights 
organisations. 
A month after his disappearance, his body was discovered 
down a ravine, some 80 kms from Medan, together with four 
other bodies which have not yet been identified. His hands and 
feet were bound and his body was covered with wounds. The 
body could only be identified after an autopsy revealed inter-
nal evidence of a past operation and positive dental evidence. 
After a brief stay in Banda Aceh where he hosted Carmel 
Budiardjo of TAPOL and Sinapan Samydurai, secretary-
general of the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh 
on their three-day visit to Aceh, Jafar left Banda Aceh for 
Medan. On the way, he spent two days with his family in 
Lhokseumawe, his birthplace. Jafar was always conscious of 
the fact that he was a target of military intelligence and told 
friends shortly before his disappearance that he knew he was 
being followed. On several occasions, military intelligence 
claimed that he was the spokesperson of GAM, the Aceh 
Liberation Movement, in a clear attempt to damage his credi-
bility as a human rights activist. 
A carefully planned abduction 
The circumstances of his abduction suggests that it was a 
carefully-planned operation and almost certainly carried out by 
a well-trained intelligence unit. 
Jafar had arrived in Medan only a few days earlier and was 
staying with relatives. Because he realised he was being 
followed, he under took to phone home every two hours as a 
precaution. On the day of his disappearance, he left home in 
the morning to visit a lawyer friend, Alamsyah Hamdani, with 
whom he had formerly worked at the LBH-Medan, and had an 
appointment with a Japanese activist, Saeki Natsuko at 5pm. 
He kept the first appointment and left to meet a journalist 
whose name is not known. After making two phone-calls 
home, he visited a business acquaintance and left at I pm. From 
then on, he made no further phone-calls home. When he failed 
to turn up for his 5pm appointment, the Japanese friend 
contacted his family. By midnight, they realised something 
serious had happened. 
The following day, after visiting all the hospitals in Medan 
to see whether he had been injured in an accident, they 
reported his disappearance to the North Sumatra chief of 
police, Brig-General Sutanto but were told that the complaint 
was not acceptable without evidence that he had disappeared. 
This inexcusable response was reported to Asmara Nababan, 
secretary-general of the National Human Rights Commission 
in Jakarta, who told the police chief that the police were 
obliged under the 1999 Human Rights Law to respond to all 
such complaints. 
On 9 August, members of Jafar's family with friends and 
lawyers visited the regional military command in Medan, 
asking for a meeting with the regional commander but were 
told he was not available. When they returned the following 
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day, they were told that neither the commander nor members of 
his staff could meet them. Efforts by the British and US 
embassies in Jakarta who very early on had been informed of 
the disappearance, to contact the military in Medan were 
unsuccessful. The US embassy pressed the military very hard 
throughout because of Jafar's status as a permanent US resi-
dent. The refusal of top police and military authorities to 
conduct investigations is an inexcusable dereliction of duty and 
suggests they knew there was something to hide. 
Internationalising the Aceh case 
For years, Jafar was totally committed to internationalising 
the Aceh case, to creating mechanisms to bring human rights 
violations in Aceh to a wider audience, in the conviction that 
this would force the Indonesian authorities to end the repres-
sion. Under the umbrella of the IFA, he drew together 
Acehnese living in all parts of the US and with their support, 
his death. 
Human rights defenders in danger 
The murder of Jafar has once again turned the spotlight on 
the dangers confronting human rights defenders in Aceh. In 
November 1999 five activists from Yayasan Karya Bersama 
who were suppl~ing relief to a refugee camp ~ere taken into 
custody by troops of a local military command m South Aceh. 
A member of the group, Muhammad Baikal was beaten and 
badly tortured but the others escaped more or less unscathed. 
Another targeted organisation is the People's Crisis Centre 
which has safe houses and centres in many parts of Aceh. On 
19 January 2000, a PCC member was beaten during an attack 
on the PCC branch in Cot Ijue, Matang Geulampang Dua, 
Jeumpa Sub-district, North Aceh. Members of Brimob opened 
fire and forced their way into the PCC building damaging 
doors and windows. The male volunteers were ordered outside 
where they were told to eat dirt. Rizanur, the coordinator of 
PCC Matang Geulumpang Dua was beaten by a police 
officer from North Aceh who had arrived at the scene 
after the Brimob attack. Rizanur had to be treated in 
hospital for his injuries. 
Two months later, an activist named Sukardi from an 
environmental and community development group 
called Yayasan Rumpun Bamboo Indonesia disappeared 
on 30 January 2000 in Sawang sub-district, South Aceh. 
His body was discovered the following day, covered with 
bruises and injuries, indicating that he had been tortured 
before being put to death. This event came as a severe 
shock to the NGO community in Aceh where human 
rights NGOs of many persuasions work closely together. 
In January 2000, Tengku Nashiruddin Daucl, a 
member of the Indonesian parliament who was a 
member of a special investigation commission set up 
under President Habibie to investigate atrocities in Aceh 
during the DOM period, made an official visit to Aceh. 
On his way back to Jakarta, the MP disappeared on 24 
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At the third international meeting held in Bangkok in July 
1999, a decision was taken to set up the Support Committee on 
Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA). A special feature of the 
Bangkok meeting was that, largely at Jafar's instigation, repre-
sentatives of GAM were invited from Sweden to meet with a 
delegation from Aceh, sponsored by the governor, in the hope 
this might lead to a meeting of minds about a peaceful settle-
ment for Aceh. He went to Banda Aceh before the Bangkok 
meeting to persuade the governor to support this initiative. 
The fourth international meeting was held in Banda Aceh 
in January this year at which many Acehnese NGOs and inter-
national human rights organisations were present. When 
Sinapan Samydurai, SCHRA general-secretary, and Carmel 
Budiardjo of TAPOL met in Banda Aceh in July, they held 
discussions with Jafar about opening a SCHRA office, possi-
bly in Banda Aceh. 
One of Jafar's most recent initiatives was to launch an 
Acehnese-language publication, SuAcheh, the Voice of Aceh, 
the second edition of which was in preparation at the time of 
US mourns Jafar's death 
Jafar lived and studied in New York for several years and 
was taking a course in political science at New University. He 
was granted permanent residence and became a member of the 
recently-established Indonesian Action Network. Members of 
IAN went into action to press for action in Indonesia and the 
US to secure his release. Many protest demonstrations and 
meetings were held in Washington and New York to highlight 
Jafar's disappearance. 
On learning of his death, the US embassy said they had 
been in constant contact with his family, friends, and 
colleagues, to assist in the search for him. 'We expressed our 
deep concern about his welfare to the highest levels of the 
Indonesian government, and urged the police and other author-
ities to do all in their power to bring about his safe return. We 
regret profoundly that these efforts were unsuccessful. It is 
crucial now that the government redouble its efforts to find and 
bring to justice those responsible for the murder of Mr. 
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Hamzah and the four others found with him.' 
Sidney Jones, ~sia director of US-based Human Rights 
Watch, who campaigned hard for Jafar said he was ' one of the 
most dedicated human rights defenders I've ever known. The 
most fi.ttin~ honor to his memory will be to bring to justice not 
o~ly his killers, but those responsible for the thousands of 
disappearances that have taken place in Aceh over the last 
decade.' 
TAPOL mourns the loss of a great friend 
. In a stat~ment after Jafar's death was confirmed, TAPOL 
said that setting up an international network on human rights in 
Aceh '.had bec~m.e his obsession in the last two years of his 
short hfe and this is what prompted him to leave the comfort of 
a university course in New York and return to Aceh .. .. He 
always knew he was a marked man and that his decision placed 
him in great personal danger.' 
Carmel Budiardjo said: 'He was a gentle and kindly man, 
humane and peace-loving and always inspiring others with his 
enthusiasm. I feel privileged to have known him well .... His loss 
can only encourage us all to intensify our efforts to disseminate 
information about the appalling human rights situation in Aceh.' 
continued from page 19 
the mining company to suspend operations altogether for 
weeks. 
Although a settlement was reached in July and the strike was 
ended, it was resumed when the company announced its deci-
sion to dismiss 66 workers; the workers also set up a blockade 
around the mining facility, again forcing production to cease. 
The company is jointly owned by the Anglo-Australian 
mining company Rio Tinto and the British-American oil and 
gas compan~ ~P-Amoco. The company claimed in mid August 
that 1.85 milhon tons of output had been lost, with a sales 
value of $50 million. In a press release on 12 August, the 
~ompany w~rned that it might be forced to end its operations 
m East Kahmantan. It said: 'Shareholders from London and 
our Indonesian commissioners meet early next week. If the 
operation is still closed at that time, we expect we will be 
forced to take hard decisions.' [Indonesian Observer, 12 
August 2000] 
In a statement four days later, the SBSI said that the strike 
had been prolonged by the company's dismissal of workers and 
its refusal to withdraw a letter threatening more dismissals. 
Tensions became even worse after East Kalimantan police 
chief visited the site together with KPC's general manager and 
threatened to end the strike 'with the use of rubber bullets' . The 
SBSI called on the government to intervene to help settle the 
long-ru~ing dispute to prevent armed police from being 
brought m to end the protest. [Indonesian Observer, 18 August 
2000]. On 20 August the workers decided to end the strike. 
Military protection of mining sector 
Mining has become a major foreign exchange earner for the 
Indonesian economy, following large-scale foreign investments 
in mining during the Suharto era. The Wahid government has 
made no secret of its determination to call in the troops if neces-
sary to protect mines against unrest. [Jakarta Post, 11 July 2000] 
There have also been menacing comments by the minister for 
mines, Lt General (ret'd) Bambang Yudoyono alleging that 'exter-
nal forces' are involved in recent actions by groups defending 
their rights in the mining sector. It is against this background that 
the strike at the KPC coal mine in East Kalimantan has threat-
ened to escalate into a nasty confrontation. * 
AURI and the 1965 Affair 
Apology and Explanation 
ACEH 
A book published jointly by TAPOL and Solidamor in Jakarta 
in July this year includes an article which seriously misrepre-
sents the role of AURI, the Indonesian air force, and many o 
its members irllhe-events- ur-oetober 196.5 which led to 
Suharto's seizure of power . 
The book, entitled Plot TNI-Barat Dibalik Tragedi 1965, 
(The TNI-West's Plot in the 1965 Tragedy), includes an article 
by Coen Holtzappel first published in English in 1979 which 
alleges that AURI which at the time was headed by Air Vice 
Marshall Omar Dani, was directly in-volved in the movement 
o~Lt.Col Untung, Col. Latief and Brig.Gen. Supardjo, that the 
arr base, Halim Perdanakusumah, was the base for the group 
~t ki~ppe~ and killed a group of generals and that the key 
figure m this mvolve-ment was Lt.Colonel Heru Atmodjo who 
was then assistant director of AURI intelligence. At the time 
the ~icle was first published in English, Omar Dani had been 
convicted and was under sentence of death and Heru Atmodjo 
was serving a life sentence. Omar Dani's death sentence was 
commuted and he was released in 1995; Heru Atmodjo was 
released after serving 15 years. Only since their release have 
they been in a position to reveal the true facts. 
Holtzappel's analysis is based almost entirely on the records 
of. trials hel~ by Mahmilub, the Extraordinary Military 
Tnbunal, which were conducted primarily to legitimise 
Suharto's version of the 1965 events. Such records should 
therefore. be treated with circumspection in any analysis. 
The article alleges that Heru Atmodjo was the 'boss' of an air 
fo~ce off_ic.er, Major Sujono who organised training for left-
wmg activists and even that he supplied equipment and cash. 
It also ~lieges that Heru Atmodjo was a member of the Untung 
gro~p m charge of the kidnappings. These allegations are 
entirely groun'!less. Th~ tr~g had been denounced by the 
AURI leadership but Su1ono ignored orders front his s:upenors 
to st~. ~e~'s meeting on 1 October with Brig.General 
SupardJo is misconstrued. In fact, Heru, acting 011 orders frotJ1 
Omar Daurl who at the time was commander oJ~ kmlft~ 
theatre of war, was tok1 tD contact S\JPDJ.jo wl}p at -
on Omar DaQi1s staff,..to Uk bim ~Wl4~ 
Alth~ lJqu AtmodjQ ~~ti 
1RevR1~ Council'~ 
be ~ no~ a~~~tti!ft:" ~ 'J,VCJIJ~I 
l'nlcmtlW(1!8iJnever~ :, 
.'J'M]~~ artiDte , &istl:'J~ 
Wi!lllraU~ .tc>i~ \ti: AUIU's H8liiii 
tfj~·-.~~,WIJii~ 
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A visit to Banda Aceh 
During a one month visit to Indonesia in July, Carmel Budiardjo of TAPOL paid a visit to Banda Aceh, 
the capital of Aceh. The visit coincided with the first anniversary of the massacre on 23 July 1999 -of 
more than sixty people at a religious school led by Tengku Bantaqiah. Here is her r_eport: 
___ ,,,,,--
My visit to Banda Aceh has been darkly overshadowed by the 
disappearance and murder of Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, one of 
Aceh's foremost human rights activists, who had invited me to 
come and escorted me for much of the time. (See front page) 
The visit took place halfway through the first three months 
of the Humanitarian Pause which came into force 
on 2 June following an agreement between the 
armed re-sistance, GAM, and the Indonesian 
Government. Two things preoccupied the many 
Acehnese NGOs devoted to human rights, the 
very disappointing results of the Humanitarian 
Pause and rejection of the koneksitas trial held in 
May in which two dozen lower-ranking soldiers 
were sentenced for their role in the lcilling of Tgk 
Bantaqiah and scores of his students. (See TAPOL 
Bulletin No 159, April 2000) 
Victims describe their sufferings 
I spent my first evening meeting victims of 
recent atrocities who were now living in the 
safety of a centre run by the PCC, the People's 
Crisis Centre. The Centre's home is sparse with 
nothing but mats to sit on. I met four men and 
two young boys who had recently arrived at the 
centre. A fifth man was lying in a back room, too 
traumatised by recent experiences to meet or 
speak to anyone. 
Ridwan, a 12-year old from a village in Idi, East 
Aceh, told me that soldiers came to his home in May this year 
and asked where his brother was, alleging that he had been 
supplying rice to GAM. They started beating him when he said 
he knew nothing, and threatened to shoot him. Then, they 
grabbed him by the feet, held him upside down, bashed his 
head against a coconut tree and banged it on the floor. A few 
days after they left, he met the soldiers again while on his way 
to market when they struck him in the mouth. He ran back 
home where he lives alone with his brother as their parents are 
dead. Eventually he left home and made his way to Banda 
Aceh and was taken in by the PCC. 
Ramli , a 13-year old said his home had been destroyed by 
the army so he went to stay with friends. Two months ago 
soldiers of the much-feared Rajawali unit forced their way into 
the house at 3 am and started accusing the in-habitants of 
supplying cigarettes to GAM. Another boy in the house was 
taken to the back and beaten up, kicked and punched. Ramli 
was then dragged to a nearby market, con-fronted with a friend 
and their heads were knocked together. The soldiers then took 
him to their command post and threatened to use electric 
torture but an Acehnese soldier in the room asked them not to 
do that because Ramli was only a kid. The soldiers then stuffed 
his mouth with five cigarettes and order him to start smolcing. 
When he refused, they beat him with bamboo until he began to 
inhale. After he was allowed home later that day, he decided to 
flee,on 26 May. He t~-ld me he wouldn't go home till the troops 
leave his village. 
Both boys have not been getting any education because 
schools no longer function and many have been burnt down. 
The PCC is trying to give them 'alternative schooling'. 
Rajawali troops checking people's identity cards at a road block 
Isa Rachmat, a man in his 20s, said soldiers came to his 
home at crack of dawn on 20 May and arrested him for 
allegedly being in contact with GAM. They dragged him to a 
space below the house and when a neighbour named Tarmidi 
bin Ismail turned up, he was shot dead on the spot. After being 
taken to a Rajawali command post, he was set upon by a dog. 
His big toenail was pulled out and he was subjected to other 
forms of torture for a whole day. He was beaten in the chest till 
he started spitting blood. When the troops came to the village 
a second time, after he had been allowed home, all the villagers 
were beaten. The events have been reported to the local LBH 
who are investigating the military unit. 
An older man in the room explained that he was trying to 
track down his nephew who has disappeared. This man has 
reported his problem to many authorities, up to the UN, as well 
as to the LBH. 
Sri Jona, 22, was forced by his local administration head to 
become a TBO (auxiliary personnel) attached to a military 
unit. His task was to show troops the way when out on patrol. 
The local administration chief had also set up a Front 
Penyelamat Aceh or Front to Save Aceh, in favour of keeping 
Aceh as part of the Republic. 
The unit to which he was attached was the notorious Rajawali. 
(See box.) Two months after he became a TBO he 
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saw the soldiers torture two other men for three whole days and 
then shoot them dead. He named the victims as Trifan from a 
village called Lokibang and Muchtar from the village of Jambu 
Rehat. The killings upset him so much that he decided to flee 
and found his way to the PCC for protection. 
Anger over the Bantaqiah trial 
It had escaped my attention when fixing the date of my visit 
to Aceh that it would coincide with the first anniversary of the 
massacre of the religious teacher, Tgk Bantaqiah and scores of 
his pupils. On Saturday, I was told, student groups would be 
holding a protest in a tent just outside the Grand Mosque. It 
was not till I arrived there that I realised this was a protest 
against the Bantaqiah Massacre and against the koneksitas trial 
which recently ended. While in Jakarta, I had met two 
members of the Wahid government to express TAPOL's strong 
criticism of the trial in which military investigators were 
involved and before a joint military/civilian panel of judges. 
While low-ranking soldiers had been given harsh sentences for 
having opened fire on the victims, senior-ranking officers who 
ordered the operation and took part in it were not indicted. One 
lieutenant-colonel had even 'gone missing' while un-der inves-
tigation for the crime. 
ACEH 
I was surprised to hear Attorney General Marzuki Darusman 
call it a 'very good trial', though he admitted that further trials 
would be needed before the case could be regarded as 'closed'. 
By contrast, Asmara Nababan, secretary-general of the 
National Human Rights Commission, told me he had opposed 
the holding of such a trial and tried unsuccessfully to persuade 
Human Rights Minister, Hasballah M Saad not to insist on 
such a trial being held. 
My ten-minute meeting with Minister Hasballah (he arrived 
an hour late) turned into an argument about the trial. He started 
off by insisting that the trial 'had to go ahead' because people 
in Aceh had demanded it. To my insistence that the wrong 
people had been put on trial , that there had been no attempt to 
treat the Bantaqiah Massacre as part of a state/army-sponsored 
campaign of terror and the massacre had been treated as if it 
was an ordinary crime, not a crime against humanity, he said 
that haste was essential and he could not wait for a human 
rights court to be set up because people in Aceh were calling 
for speedy justice. I said that as minister for human rights , he 
could better have exerted his efforts to pressing for a human 
rights court law to be enacted speedily than promoting such a 
trial. In the end, he admitted that his motivation was to ensure 
that 'Aceh tidak akan lepas' 'Aceh will not leave (the Republic)' . 
These were his last words as I left for another appointment. 
I related these encounters to the three hundred or so students 
gathered in the tent, among whom the word koneksitas has 
become a term of derision. Their banners told the same story. 
From everything I heard in Aceh, there was little interest in 
trials being held because, as at present conducted, they are 
remote from the need for true justice. 
Tgk Bantaqiah's widow 
A large group of the families of victims of the Ban-taqiah 
Massacre was also in town for the anniversary, giv-ing me the 
opportunity to meet the teacher's widow and others related to 
the 63 dead men. (Their figure of the number of casualties is 
higher than the figure of 56 given at the trial.) 
Bantaqiah's widow, Nurliah, lost five close relatives her 
husband, two sons and two sons-in-law. Altogether 55 fa~ilies 
lost relatives in the slaughter. She had nothing but scorn for the 
recently-held koneksitas trial of low-ranking soldiers who 
actually shot her husband and the others. 'It's like trying people 
for stealing chickens,' were her opening remarks as we began 
our conversation. She and a relative who himself lost a nephew 
and a cousin in the massacre, described what happened: 
On the day of the Massacre, troops first appeared in force in 
a neighbouring kampung at eight in the morning while two 
~rmy helicopters circled overhead. After the number of troops 
mcreased, they approached the school and surrounded it. The 
pupils and their teacher were taking part in prayers at the time. 
Two men were asked where their teacher was. 'Upstairs,' they 
were told. 'Well, call him down.' 
As he descended, the troops opened fire and killed him and 
many of the pupils on the spot. Nurliah and some other women 
w?o were upstairs, watched the slaughter from the upstairs 
wmdows. The wounded men were driven away and later killed. 
After it was all over, the women were ordered to come down 
and strip down to their underwear. After being searched, they 
were taken to a nearby kampung and told to stay there until the 
followi~g day. When they returned to the school premises, all 
the bodies had been buried and the wounded had been taken 
away. Twenty-four of the dead men were buried behind the 
school and still remain buried there. As far as the relatives 
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know, the other victims are buried in seven graves. 
The head of the PCC, Juanda, said that he had heard that 
something was about to happen at the school but when he tried 
to enter the complex, he was unable to gain access as it was 
encircled by troops. 
Another of the relatives, Zainuddin, who met me said that 
Tgk Bantaqiah had been warned that something might happen 
two weeks before when a soldier from 
the local military command arrived to 
warn him to be 'ready to die'. When he 
told local officials of the warning, they 
refused to believe it, saying that the 
government is now 'behaving decently'. 
When I told them that Minister 
Hasballah said many Acehnese people 
had pressed him to make sure that the 
koneksitas trial would go ahead, they 
said that the minister had never asked 
their opinion on the matter. In fact, he 
has never once visited them since the 
tragedy, they said. Nor has anyone 
from the military. There has been some 
talk of the families receiving compen-
sation but nothing has happened. 
sion that investigated the crimes in East Timor. This could, if 
properly conducted, pave the way for formal investig~ti~ns to 
be undertaken, leading to trials that would conform with mter-
national humanitarian Jaw. 
Meeting Flower 
I had heard so much about the women's organisation, Flower 
Asked what they wanted to happen 
now, they said: 'We need help. The real 
culprits must be brought to trial, the men Demonstration in Banda Aceh demanding the immediate trial of local military commanders 
who gave the orders for the operation.' This would mean indict- whose founder, Soraiya Kamaruzamman I first met in 
ing not only the officers in command of the resort commands Amsterdam last year, that I was very keen to spend an evening 
but the Bukit Barisan regional commander which oversees at their office. It was a very rewarding occasion. 
operations in Aceh. They said they had never been approached Being a women's organisation with a strong feminist culture, 
directly to give testimony at the trial. Their legal representative, it has a different perspective on some issues confronting the 
Kontras-Aceh, received a letter but after consulting with the people of Aceh. The women I met told me first of all about the 
relatives, they decided not to testify as they feared for their recent founding of an all-Aceh women's organisation, Serikat 
security if they testified in court. When they requested safe- Jnang Aceh which has branches in all the seven districts of the 
guards from the court, they were told that their security in court province. They explained that in Aceh's long history, women 
could be guaranteed, but not afterwards. held a position of equality with men at the very highest levels 
More trials in Aceh? 
Both Darusman and Hasballah assured me when I met them 
in Jakarta that the Bantaqiah case was not closed and another 
trial could follow. However, there have been no signs of this 
nor anything about the 'missing' suspect, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Sudjono who disappeared eight months ago. 
In any case, the Coalition of Human Rights NGOs in Aceh 
has stated its strong opposition to any further trials along the 
lines of the Bantaqiah trial. In a statement in July, the 
Coalition's Team to Resolve Cases in Aceh called on the 
government to postpone further trials until such time as the 
trials can be held in accordance with international humanitar-
ian law. They were disappointed with the announced intention 
of human rights minister, Hasballah M Saad, to hold a trial 
regarding the Rumoh Geudong case (this was the torture centre 
run by Kopassus, the army's elite command during DOM) 
some time in August this year. Abdul Rachim Yacob, who 
chairs the Team, said the government should give priority to 
setting up a human rights court where proper human rights 
instruments would be used and not hold any more trials based 
on the Criminal Code. [Waspada, 21 July 2000] 
Demands are also being made for a Commission of Inquiry 
or KPP-HAM to be set up by Komnas-HAM for all the crimes 
against humanity in Aceh, along the lines of commissions set 
up for other crimes against humanity, es-pecially the commis-
of social and political activity, including becoming state lead-
ers or commanding war operations. But an Islamic decree -
fatwa - adopted some while ago had established the principle 
that women may not become rulers. This was the first step 
towards the domestication of women. Their role as decision-
makers had been undercut and they were now less likely to 
speak out. 
The women's conference held last year had led to the emer-
gence of women's groups in many parts of Aceh, and Serikat 
Inang Aceh had come into being as a result. 
They told me also of the key role Acehnese women play in 
economic and productive activity, although security op-
erations frequently made it difficult for such activities to 
proceed. Decisions by local communities to evacuate in the 
face of security threats also undermines agricultural pro-
duction. Observations by their network of contacts indicate 
that evacuations often happened at the prompting of unclear 
sources. The first phase of mass evacuations started in June 
1999 when tens of thousands left their villages. Subsequently, 
most of the refugees returned home, but in re-cent weeks, evac-
uations are again on the increase because civilian communities 
feel unsafe when armed clashes occur or when the security 
forces conduct sweepings, searching for GAM members. 
They were unimpressed by the Humanitarian Pause (see 
below) and felt that this is being used by GAM forces to 
regroup and consolidate. Their activities among the grass-roots 
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has made them critical of GAM activities which they believe is 
losing its popularity. 
They also feel that people who strongly promote the referen-
dum idea need to be more specific about what they mean and 
what kind of an independent state they visualise. They strongly 
reject the koneksitas system of justice but feel that not enough 
has been done to coordinate oppo-sition to the trials. 
How much of a Humanitarian Pause? 
The people I met on my first day in Aceh all confirmed that 
whereas the level of violence had declined during the first 
month of the humanitarian pause, the trend had since reversed 
and was giving cause for alarm. 
The humanitarian pause came into force on 2 June following 
a joint understanding between GAM, the Aceh Liberation 
Movement, and the Indonesian government, brokered by the 
Henry Dunant Centre based in Switzerland. Although it is 
often referred to as a ceasefire in press reports, the Joint 
Understanding is much less than that. As one HDC official 
described it, the agreement is 'minimalist'. As stipulated in the 
official document, the aim is 'to reduce tension' . The objectives 
are: 'delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population', 
'provision of security modalities with a view to supporting the 
delivery of hu-manitarian assistance and to reducing tension 
and violence which may cause further suffering', and 'the 
promotion of confidence-building measures towards a peace-
ful solution to the conflict situation in Aceh'. [See Joint 
Understanding on Humanitarian Pause for Aceh, signed in 
Bavois, Switzerland on 12 May 2000.] 
Under the agreement, two Joint Committees have been set up, 
the Joint Committee on Security Modalities and the Joint 
Committee on Humanitarian Aid, the former obviously being 
the key one. Both joint committees are composed of ten 
members, five from GAM and five from the Indonesian side . 
The five Indonesian members are all from the armed forces. 
Each of the committees is shadowed by a Joint Monitoring 
Committee whose task it is to investigate violations of the 
'ground rules' which are set out in a separate document. 
However, the agreement makes no provision for sanctions 
against violators and neither is there any form of mediation. So 
when disputes arise about a violation, it's just a matter of one 
side's word against the other's. In other words, the Joint 
Understanding lacks teeth and relies on nothing more that the 
goodwill of both sides. 
On the day I arrived in BandaAceh, I attended a press confer-
ence which was held to announce the establishment of an NGO 
monitoring group called Simpul. This was in response to wide-
spread dissatisfaction about the effective-ness of the officially 
sponsored monitoring committees. The NGOs have extensive 
networks of independent observers right across Aceh, with 
strong roots in the community and very well placed to investi-
gate incidents which breach the security ground rules. It 
seemed to me that the role of civil society in Aceh may have 
been marginalised by the GAM-Indonesia accord, which is 
very strange considering that the whole point of the accord is 
to facilitate the provision of humanitarian aid to the population. 
The NGO network in Aceh includes some extremely well organ-
ised groups working at different levels and broadly complement-
ing each other and their determination to become much more 
directly involved was clearly a step forward. 
I heard from several well placed people that the Joint 
Committee on Humanitarian Aid had hardly got going, already 
halfway through the first three months of the accord. 
ACEH 
Moreover, NGOs were confronting harassment from the secu-
rity forces when they attempted to supply humanitarian aid to 
people in refugee camps. 
There have been many instances of the security forces exert-
ing strong pressure on thousands of people in camps to return 
home. A case in point is the 2,8 15 famil ies who fled their 
homes in Tanah Luas and Matangkuli , North Aceh to find 
sanctuary in a location near the Exxon-Oil airport. Refugees 
were terrified at the sound of shots fired by troops who had 
come to persuade them to return home. 'Never in my life have 
I felt so scared, being driven away like some kind of animal,' 
said one refugee. Jakarta Post, 20 July 2000] 
Security conditions during the Pause 
There have been numerous incidents since the Pause began 
in which people have disappeared (some subsequently being 
found dead), sweepings in localities, armed clashes between 
the two armed sides in the conflict and the destruction of build-
ings. According to Kontras, in a press release issued on 17 July, 
in the six weeks since the Pause began, sixty people had been 
killed (including members of the security forces and GAM), 
which included ten extra-judicial killings, and forty people had 
been tortured. 
In one incident, a rubber planter in Julok who was being 
harassed by two members of Rajawali to hand over part of the 
proceeds from his sales turned on his tormentors and struck 
them with a knife. The soldiers were making de-mands in addi-
tion to the percentage which the tappers are required to hand 
over to the unit. One of the soldiers died while the other who 
was injured opened fire with his automatic weapon and killed 
three rubber tappers standing nearby. 
The Pause is up for renewal at the beginning of September 
and both sides have indicated that they intend to extend the 
agreement for another three months. While agreeing that the 
accord should be extended, Acehnese NGOs have called for the 
Joint Committees, particularly the one on humanitarian aid, to 
be re-structured so as to include representatives of civil society, 
or still better to be composed wholly of civilians. It is their 
contention that humanitarian aid is being used for political 
purposes by both sides, each seeking to take the credit for the 
provision of aid, whereas the beneficiaries themselves are not 
represented on the committee. 
Special award 
I was deeply touched by a special award given to me on my 
last evening in Banda Aceh by eight Acehnese NGOs. I was 
given the title 'Cut' (pronounced 'chut') which is a title of 
honour for Acehnese women. The ceremony was opened Jafar 
Siddiq and the plaque bearing my new name was handed to me 
by lbu Nurliah, the widow of Tgk Bantaqiah. It quotes the 
words of Winston Churchill, 'Never in history have so many 
owed so much to so few', and says: 'In the internationalisation 
of the Acheh conflict, Carmel Budiardjo is definitely an ace 
among the few.' In my words of acceptance, I said that I did not 
stand alone but was part of a team in TAPOL which has been 
committed for years to reporting the situation in Aceh. * 
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Demand for international intervention in Maluku • growing 
It is now widely accepted that Maluku is where the most senseless and persistent violence in Indone-
sia is taking place. Almost half a million people have fled their villages in search of refuge. Many have 
found sanctuary in the neighbouring islands of Sulawesi, West Timor and West Papua. If the violence 
continues, this refugee problem could well spread to neighbouring countries. 
Despite numerous statements by the most highly-placed helmet intervention in Maluku has therefore become a very 
authorities in Jakarta, the conflict in Maluku shows no signs of touchy political issue. 
abating. The call for international intervention is becoming But there is another side to the story. The call for inter-
more strident and international bodies like the UN and the national intervention did not fall from the sky. TNI (Indo-
European Union are now exerting pressure on Jakarta. In mid nesian armed forces) chief Admiral Widodo has frankly admit-
July UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan phoned President ted that some of his troops have sided with the warring parties. 
Wahid to express his concern. He asked about actions taken by National chief of police General Rusdihardjo has expressed the 
the Indonesian security fear that if the 
apparatus to end the violence in 
violence and also Maluku continues, 
wanted to know the UN Security 
whether the UN should Council will adopt 
establish a presence in a resolution to 
Maluku. Gus Dur, as send in a peace-
Wahid is popularly keeping force. 
known, told Annan that Human Rights 
his government was M i n i s t e r 
doing everything Hasballah Saad 
possible though he has expressed 
admitted that hu-mani- sympathy for the 
tarian assistance was idea of interna-
needed. The initial tional interven-
follow-up has been the tion. 
decision to set up two A . number of 
resource posts for four peace and human 
UN . h~manitarian The streets of Ambon-City are full of military and militia units rights organisa-
agenc1es m Ambon tions in Holland, 
and Ternate though if security conditions do not improve, it is including TAPOL, issued a call at the time of the ASEAN 
difficult to see how these agencies will operate. ministerial meeting for limited intervention, con-sisting 
The ASEAN ministerial meeting in Bangkok in the third primarily of ASEAN forces. It referred to the con-duct of Thai 
week of July also discussed the problem of Maluku but and Filipino troops in East Timor, saying that this suggested 
produced nothing concrete. The sacred ASEAN doctrine of that they could play a helpful role in Maluku. It also took into 
non-intervention has eroded in the last two years, especially consideration that the general view in Indonesia was still very 
over the Black September tragedy in East Timor last year and much against a UN humanitarian intervention. 
the appalling human rights situation in Burma which became a Leading human rights groups in Indonesia have already 
member of ASEAN despite strong protests over its human concluded that Indonesia is not capable ofresolving the conflict 
rights record. However, the violence in Maluku is beginning to in Maluku. PBHI, the Indonesian Legal Aid and Human Rights 
create new challenges for ASEAN and this could spread to Association, was the first to demand inter-national intervention. 
Australia and the Pacific islands. Chairman Hendardi urged Gus Dur to call for a UN presence. 
Intervention, a Christian ploy? 
There have been many calls for international intervention but 
most of the pressure has come from Christian bodies. The 
World Council of Churches has issued a statement demanding 
intervention as has the Vatican. 
There is a widely-held perception in Indonesia that a scheme 
has been concocted in the West (the US, European Union and 
Australia) for the break-up oflndonesia. Statements by secular 
bodies such as the European Union or the US State Department 
are seen as part of this Christian conspiracy. 
Many Indonesians see the 'loss' of East Timor as being the 
result of international intervention aimed at the disintegration 
of the Indonesian Republic. The very thought of a UN blue-
'What are the choices?' he asked. 'Do we want to save the lives 
of thousands of people, or should we go on babbling about 
narrow nationalistic interests, inherited from the New Order'. 
Munir of Kontras, has issued a similar statement. 
The secretary-general ofKomnas HAM, the National Human 
Rights Commission, Asmara Nababan, also stated that the 
Jakarta government should invite international peace keeping 
forces. Eighteen months of unresolved conflict plus the failure 
of the civil emergency declared in June has only shown that 
Indonesia is not able to resolve the problem. Nababan said it 
would be better to invite troops from the ASEAN countries. 
TNI actively involved in the fighting 
It has been widely reported from Maluku that some Brimob 
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(elite police) troops are siding with the Christians while 
Kostrad (elite army reserve) troops and Brawijaya (East Java 
territorial) troops are siding with the Muslims. In fact, the situ-
ation is far more complex. Reports on the internet and in the 
mainstream Indonesian press have given graphic accounts of 
attacks by both sides on villages of the other side. Particularly 
worrying is the fact that standard army weapons are increas-
ingly being used by the warring militia units. 
Since late June when the civil emergency was declared, the 
situation has only worsened. About 16,000 fresh troops have 
arrived to be stationed in different parts of Maluku, but the 
fighting has continued. The ineffectiveness of the Indonesian 
armed forces only strengthens the conviction that they are part 
of the problem, not part of the solution. 
Two recent events have destroyed what remained of the TNI's 
credibility. On 21 June Muslim militia attacked the Brimob 
barracks in Tantui, on the island of Ambon, and destroyed the 
entire complex. Instead of defending their barracks, members 
ofBrimob took sides, some with the Christians and others with 
the Muslims. The Christian Brimob units retreated to a 
Christian area, taking many weapons. The Muslim Brimob 
units joined the attack on their own headquarters. Police HQ in 
Jakarta had to send a special squad to resolve this conflict 
within Brimob ranks. The Brimob barracks are close to a mili-
tary post where battalion 733 and KOSTRAD battalion 303 are 
stationed. It is widely assumed that soldiers from both battal-
ions took part in the attack. 
The second event was the tragic assault on Waai village north 
of Ambon city on 30 July, following an earlier attack when 
many houses and churches were burnt down. During Sunday 
mass on 30 July, a huge force of people, backed by around 
forty TNI soldiers, attacked the devastated village. Despite 
earlier appeals for a protective force of troops, the village had 
been left defenceless. Following the second attack, 5,000 
villagers fled to the mountains, leaving 29 people dead. Aid 
agencies have described their circum-stances in the mountains 
as deplorable and life-threatening. According to earlier reports, 
TNI units taking part in an attack on a Christian area in Ambon 
used a UK-made Saladin armoured personal carrier to provide 
cover to Muslim units. [The Independent, 18 July 2000] 
The situation in Arnbon has deteriorated even further with the 
growing number of snipers. These well-trained marksmen 
shoot at innocent people from both sides. These acts of provo-
cation have increased the tension and deepened the animosity 
between the communities. 
Divisions within the TNI 
The events in Maluku point to a collapse in the military 
command structure but what is happening on the ground in 
Maluku mirrors the fracturing of the armed forces as a whole. 
In Maluku, local military commanders can be di-vided into 
three categories, those who are unable to stop the violence; 
those who are unwilling to stop the violence and those who are 
organising and fanning the conflict. The military HQ in Jakarta 
recently replaced the key commanders in Maluku. Brig. Brig-
General Max Tamaela, the territorial commander was replaced 
and with him the four dis-trict commanders. The new territor-
ial chief, Brig. General I Made Yasa, is a Balinese with a Hindu 
background. As a local Christian, his predecessor had become 
unacceptable to the Muslim community. 
The divisions within the TNI reflect the divisions in Ja-karta. 
Military analysts have divided TNI officers into three groups. 
About ten per cent are reformers, mostly . in the navy and air 
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force plus a small number of army generals. They back the 
policy of the TNI's withdrawal from political affairs and have 
pushed hard for the abolition of the military doctrine 
Dwifungsi, which justifies the political role of the military. At 
a TNI seminar earlier this year, they pushed hard for an end to 
Dwifungsi . They are close to Gus Dur and the pro-reform 
movement but represent a small minority within TNI. In a 
major TNI reshuffle in January many reformers were 
appointed to strategic positions but in a subsequent reshuffle in 
July, most of them lost their jobs. Reform-minded officers like 
Agus Wirahadikusumah, Saurip Kadi and Romulo Simbolon 
have now been with-drawn to TNI headquarters without being 
assigned any posts. 
The second group, the so-called hard-liners, believe they are 
still entitled to define the course of the nation and play a role 
in political affairs. They are mostly army officers and include 
powerful generals like Wiranto, Djadja Suparman and 
Prabowo. They are of a kind with officers who served the Orde 
Baru dictatorship for more than three decades. Their bottom 
line is to reject civilian supremacy over the military. In the past 
few years, their influence has diminished, not least because 
they resorted to so much violence to keep the Suharto regime 
afloat. Some are still loyal to the dictator Suharto but their 
common ground these days is the need to defend their political 
and economic assets. They are also well connected with former 
cronies and relatives of the Suharto family. Associated with 
this group are many officers with a military intelligence back-
ground. These are the officers who are likely to be stirring up 
the conflict in Maluku. They were the ones who financed and 
trained the militias in East Tim or, a vivid example of how ruth-
less they are. Their aim is twofold: to create instability to show 
that the military are indispensable, and to underline the inade-
quacy of civilian rule. 
The third group, by far the largest, are the so-called constitu-
tionalists, and account for about 80 per cent of the officers. 
This group is more difficult to define. They function as aver-
age soldiers, obeying commands, which can also mean accept-
ing the fact of an elected civilian government. On the other 
hand, many are unhappy with the present situation. They have 
lost political and economic power since Suharto's downfall 
with nothing to take its place. 
The state budget for the military is very low and covers no 
more than 30 per cent of actual expenditure; the shortfall is 
covered by the proceeds from business corporations owned by 
the military. Large sections of the military are increasingly 
involved in organised crime like prostitution, drug-trafficking, 
illegal casinos, security arrangements for shopping malls and 
so on, to supplement their earnings. The Gus Dur government 
faces insuperable economic problems and cannot pay better 
wages, or provide better training and equipment for the average 
TNI soldier. Growing instability in the many trouble-spots 
(master-minded by their fellow officers of the second cate-
gory) only forces them into the firing line, putting their lives at 
risk. Increasing numbers of soldiers are unwilling to be sent to 
war zones like Aceh or Maluku. The TNI rank and file , where 
demoralisation is rampant, is widely represented in this group. 
Factors in the conflict 
In the last few years Indonesia has experienced several ethnic 
and religious conflicts. The worst was the conflict in West 
Kalimantan between local Dayaks and settlers from Madura in 
December 1996. Such conflicts are often complex because 
many local and external factors play a part but the West 
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Kalimantan conflict remained local and eventually died out. 
The conflict in Maluku also contains a local and an external 
factor but the latter, the power struggle in Jakarta, has played 
the dominant role. In most accounts, the conflict is analysed in 
terms of the contradictions between the local communities in 
Maluku. Many Indonesianists as well as academics from 
Maluku take this approach. But human rights organisations 
take a different approach and have put more emphasis on the 
power struggle in Jakarta and its impact on Maluku [see 
TAPOL Bulletin Nos .. 151, 152, 156 and 158]. 
The dramatic demographic change in Maluku in the last two 
decades is seen by some as the source of the conflict. Many 
new settlers have poured into Maluku, gaining positions in the 
economy. There is also the shift from Christian domination of 
the provincial administration to a more Muslim bureaucracy. A 
Muslim entrepreneurial middle class has emerged. But there is 
no reason to believe that these changes could have sparked 
such a vicious and entrenched communal war. 
Big money from Jakarta 
The demographic changes in parts of Maluku are relatively 
small as compared with parts of Aceh, West Papua or West 
Kalimantan. Transmigration figures for the last 30 years (six 5-
year development periods) in Maluku show that 22,799 fami-
lies were resettled in four districts of Maluku, mostly in 
Central Maluku, North Seram and on Buru island. They consti-
tute less than 5 per cent of the population of Maluku and are 
remote from the populated areas. These transmigrants were poor 
and remain poor and cannot be said to provoke economic envy. 
The majority of refugees now living in other parts (see sepa-
rate article) come from the populated areas, notably Arnbon-
City and other towns in Central Maluku. A bustling city like 
Ambon already enjoyed a multi-ethnic composition before the 
conflict. Some 35 per cent of the population were ethnic 
Buginese, Butonese or Makassarese, often lumped together as 
'BBM'. Many, in particular the Butonese, have been living in 
Ambon for generations. It is difficult to imagine a town in 
Ambon without a Butonese neighbourhood. While some BBM 
merchants have become quite successful, the majority are 
small traders or work as manual labourers. These people have 
been part of the population of Maluku and became the first 
victims of the conflict. 
The big change in Ambon in the last two or three decades has 
been the emergence of big capital from Jakarta. The clove 
monopoly business set up by Tommy Suharto is one example. 
But huge investments were also made in forestry, agri-busi-
ness, mining and fishing. These companies employed people 
from Jakarta and Java as their managers, not locals or BBM 
people. As is always the case, they provided no job opportuni-
ties for the locals. 
Conflict engineered from Jakarta 
Statements by Defence Minister Yuwono Sudarsono that 
Suharto supporters are behind the Maluku riots and by the TNI 
spokesperson Marshal Graito U sodo that troops are actually 
involved in the conflict has only confirmed the analysis of 
human rights organisations. Munir from Kontras, one ·of 
Indonesia's leading human rights organisations, has bluntly 
stated: 'It's up to the military whether the conflict will end, not 
the people in Maluku'. 
Kontras is one of the few organisations which took the risk 
of monitoring violations in trouble spots. They had an active 
branch in East Timor and their branches in Maluku and Aceh 
have provided first-class information. Earlier this year, Kontras 
produced a confidential report which provides a detailed 
account of the intricate connection between army personnel 
and warring gangs on both sides of the divide. Kontras decided 
to present the report only to the country's leading politicians, the 
president, the vice-president, the chair of the DPR and the chair of 
the People's Congress. Munir explained that it was kept confiden-
tial to protect the identity of their sources. 
Munir points the finger at General Wiranto, former comman-
der-in-chief of the TNI, as the main culprit who is responsible 
for the Maluku tragedy. This is the man who was removed from 
office because of his crimes in East Timor. Other names have 
been mentioned in the press, including Lt. General Djadja 
Suparman, the former Kostrad commander and Wiranto's most 
trusted officer. In recent press reports, he has been mentioned 
as the one who fi-nanced the training of Muslim jihad fighters 
with funds from the Kostrad business, Yayasan Darma Putera 
Kostrad. Investigations initiated by Agus Wirahadikusumah, 
recently sacked as Kostrad commander, revealed that an 
astounding 164 billion rupiahs ($18 million) is unaccounted 
for in the books of the Kostrad business. 
There is every reason to believe that the tragedy in Maluku is 
the great success story for the military hardliners. They have 
stage-managed so many horrific incidents in the archipelago 
that the population in conflict areas like Halmahera and 
Ambon now believe that the other party is out to exterminate 
them. Local warlords have virtually taken over as community 
leaders on the pretext of defending the population. It is now 
widely accepted that the military has its finger on the trigger in 
Aceh and Maluku. 
At a time when President Wahid was corning under heavy 
pressure from his political rivals in the weeks prior to the MPR 
session, when he was facing threats of im-peachment, he was 
forced to negotiate with Lt. General Djadja Suparman about 
Maluku. This was nothing short of humiliating for the presi-
dent as he had removed Suparman only a few months earlier 
for his blunt statements of insub-ordination to Wahid as armed 
forces supreme commander. Some analysts argue that Wahid 
agreed to sack the reform-minded general who he had 
appointed to replace Suparman on the understanding that the 
hardliners would end the violence in Maluku. Even if this were 
true, there is no reason to believe that Suparman would keep to 
his side of the bargain. 
Moreover, far from retreating on the question of the army's 
role in political affairs, the hardliners have won the agreement 
of virtually all the political groupings in the MPR to push 
through a constitutional amendment giving the TNI the consti-
tutional right to occupy seats in the Assembly. Human rights 
activists in Indonesia have greeted news of this amendment with 
alarm and see it as a setback for the reform movement and the 
struggle for civilian supremacy over the military. Unbelievable 
as it may seem, stories are circulating that MPR members were 
railroaded by powerful generals into supporting the amendment 
or face the prospect of increased violence in Maluku. 
The tragedy in Maluku, which has resulted in such terrible 
loss of life, has become the tool with which the armed forces 
are forcing political parties to comply with their wishes. If this 
situation is allowed to continue, the prospects for reform and 
democracy in Indonesia and an end to the conflict in Maluku 
are very bleak. * 
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East Timor, one year on 
On 30 August last year, the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence. In the wake 
of that vote, the Indonesian army and their militia cohorts destroyed everything and drove a quarter of 
a million people across the border to West Timor. Run now by UNTAET, a transitional UN adminis-
tration, the country stands on the threshold of becoming an independent state. Rebuilding their coun-
try from the ruins, the East Timorese are cautiously optimistic. 
Security is now in the hands of an international peace-keep-
ing force commanded by a Thai officer and negotiations are 
underway for FALINTIL to play a role in defending the terri-
tory. A joint cabinet composed of UN officials and East 
Timorese representatives in equal numbers has been set up, 
while key positions in the local administration are being taken 
over by local people, in preparation for independence that will 
follow general elections due to be held next August. 
A major challenge is creating a new civil service. The 
Indonesian administration was far too corrupt and inefficient 
to provide the basis for the new East Timor's civil service. 
CNRT, a gradual transformation 
In August, the CNRT, the National Council of Timorese 
Resistance, held its first congress in Dili. Predictions that it 
would fall apart proved wrong. Although it was clearly appar-
ent that the CNRT's organisation structure is still fragile, there 
was agreement that the Council should continue to exist during 
the period of transition. However, as political parties start 
campaigning in next year's general election, the Council is 
likely to disintegrate, having already served its function. The 
congress discussed moves to draft a state constitution, a law on 
political parties and general elections and future economic 
strategy. It was decided however to leave the final decisions on 
these matters to an elected national assembly, which will form 
the basis of East Timor's first government. 
The CNRT came into being, in place of the CNRM, at a 
conference in Portugal in 1997 after encountering many inter-
nal difficulties. These arose largely from its complex structure 
which includes political parties of divergent views, and many 
organisations as well as individual members. 
It became clear as the congress progressed that the roles of 
East Timor's two most outstanding leaders, its president, 
Xanana Kay Raia Gusmao, and its vice-president, Jose Ramos 
Horta, were still vital. In spite of all his protestations, Xanana 
Gusmao, the man who re-organised the resistance in the dark 
days after 1979, has emerged as the most likely person to lead 
an independent East Timor. The day before the congress 
opened, in a moving ceremony to mark the 25th anniversary of 
the founding of FALINTIL, the armed wing of the resistance, 
on 21 August 1975, he resigned as its commander, thus estab-
lishing a clear demarcation between the military and political 
leadership. On the same occasion, Nobel peace laureate, Jose 
Ramos Horta, handed over his award to the force . While he 
certainly has his critics, Horta has won world recognition as a 
formidable diplomat who has travelled the world for 25 years, 
tirelessly fighting for East Timor's right to self-determination. 
The two men resigned as members of FRETILIN during the 
1980s so as to free their hands as national leaders. They may 
well align themselves to existing or new political parties. But 
in the transition period, they still work closely as a team and 
true to form, they both attended the UN's Millennium Summit 
in September. 
The CNRT congress was attended by several generations of 
political leaders; the older generation, the leaders of 
FRETILIN and the UDT, who continued the struggle in the 
diaspora, and a much younger generation of men and women 
who cut their teeth in the clandestine struggle inside East 
Timor and in Indonesia. 
The new parameters 
Besides the nascent government structures, civil society is 
rapidly emerging. Scores of East Timorese NGOs are now 
functioning, at least 72 at the last count, a few of which did 
outstanding work under Indonesian rule. The NGO community 
was disappointed at being largely marginalised during the 
CNRT Congress. Observers have also noted a lack of coordi-
nation between the East Timorese NGOs and the 68 interna-
tional NGOs, although in many sectors their operations over-
lap. The latter generally speaking are awash with facilities 
while most of the former lack the most basic necessities to 
enable them to function. An East Timorese NGO Forum was 
set up some months ago, but its director recently told TAPOL 
that he desperately needs more staff and equipment in order to 
help organise the NGO community to function properly. 
UNTAET has come in for a great deal of criticism for its 
heavy-handed control in almost every sphere and for the many 
difficulties standing in the way ofTimorese participation at all 
levels of the administration. Unemployment is still widespread 
and there is a glaring contrast between living standards and 
wages of foreign staff and local people. 
There is a pressing need to create new state institutions and 
enact laws and regulations, with priority being given to setting 
up a judiciary with courts to handle ordinary crimes as well as 
dealing with the many people now in detention who committed 
crimes against humanity. 
But in the countryside and in many of the towns, life is grad-
ually returning to normal. Xanana Gusmao has emphasise that 
economic recovery must primarily be focused on rural areas so 
that the country can end its total dependence on external aid. 
He has stressed the need to encourage the population to return 
to the rural areas from which they were massively displaced by 
the violence. Building materials have started arriving and 
homes and schools are going up. Agricultural production is 
starting again in many parts of the country. But the excessive 
presence of international aid agencies poses the danger of aid-
dependency because of the propensity for foreigners to under-
value home-grown methods in favour of foreign models.* 
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Carmel's visit to Indonesia 
After an absence of nearly 29 years, Carmel Budiardjo, the founder of TAPOL, was finally able to visit 
Indonesia, having been removed from the blacklist. Although she had been granted a visa, immigration 
officials were on hand to check the records and only waved her through after a colleague got on the phone 
to President Wahid's office complaining that I was having 'problems' at the air-port. Here is her report. 
The four weeks I spent in Indonesia filled me with excite-
ment, seeing at first hand the activities of so many old friends 
and younger pro-democracy activists who have been able to 
retain a sense of optimism and dedication despite the disheart-
ening political situation in which they are now forced to live 
and work. 
One of the most frequent questions I was 
asked was, how has Indonesia changed since I 
was expelled from the country in November 
1971. In those days, Suharto was in power, at 
least a hundred thousand people were still in 
prison, and I had to sneak out the country, seen 
off only by a British embassy official and 
watched in the shadows by army intelligence. 
Now, I was returning as an honoured visitor 
with many friends eager to shake my hand, 
welcoming me as someone who kept the flame 
of human rights burning when conditions in 
Indonesia and East Timor could hardly have 
been bleaker. 
Democratic space 
Two years after the ousting of Suharto, civil 
society still has a democratic space within 
which to work, made possi-ble by the coming 
of crimes against humanity in conformity with international 
humanitarian law. It is far from clear whether the latest changes 
in government, giving Vice President Megawati a far greater 
role in government , will make any difference to these critical 
issues. 
One of the first and most moving events was my re-union with 
Kunjungan 
CARMEL BUDIARDJO 
to power of Indonesia's first democratically- __, ___ _ 
elected president. But this space may be under Carmel among old friends. Second left former Colonel Latief; right, Coki Naipospos, 
threat if the political instability which was so who hosted the meeting. 
palpable to me turns the tide back to the advantage of authori- twenty or so of my former prison mates in Bukit Duri. They all 
tarian forces. looked hale and hearty with the exception of Sri Ambar, so 
All the time, a fierce power struggle was underway between frail and incapacitated by a stroke that I wept as I hugged this 
the 'political elite', with party leaders vying with each other to formerly resolute trade union leader. She is now cared for by 
undermine the position of President Abdurrachman Wahid, her one remaining daughter. The other daughter was abducted 
making his hold on power tenuous to say the least. These by an army officer in 1966 and has never been seen since. 
intrigues seem to be pushing Indonesia to the brink of 
economic catastrophe and political disintegration with no one 
- not even Gus Dur as Wahid is known - having the capacity or 
the vision to build a democratic Indonesia, ushering in a 
complete break with Suharto's New Order. 
It was obvious to everyone I met that these power games were 
far removed from the basic problems of resolving the 
economic crisis, getting some of the forty million unemployed 
back to work and pushing forward the reform agenda, about 
which there was so much enthusiasm last October when Wahid 
was voted into office. New Order forces still dominate all the 
state institutions and corruption is as rife as it has ever been. 
At all times I was acutely aware of a dysfunction between 
what was happening at the top, among power-holders and 
would-be power-holders, and the determined efforts by our 
friends in civil society trying to press the reform agenda, seek-
ing justice for the victims of so many massacres and atrocities 
during the New Order and pushing for an overhaul of the judi-
ciary that would make it possible to hold trials of those guilty 
Investigating the 1965/66 massacre 
Much of my time was spent meeting groups that have been 
set up to investigate the 1965/66 massacre and to end discrim-
ination that still affects the lives of millions of for-mer prison-
ers from the 1965 event and other, more recent atrocities. 
Foremost among these groups is Yayasan Penelitian Korban 
Pembunuhan 1965166, the Institute for the Study of the 
1965/66 Massacre. The Institute was founded in April 1999, 
inspired by the efforts of Ibu Sulami, herself a former po 1 itical 
prisoner who from the moment of her re-lease in 1988, has 
dedicated herself to investigating the massacre and to exposing 
the role of General Suharto in this horror which consolidated 
his grip on power after he had taken control of the armed forces 
in October 1965. 
I was invited to a meeting at the Yayasan's office which is 
located in the very simple home of Thu Sulami and her sister 
in a remote part of Tangerang, on the outskirts of Jakarta. W~ 
had a long, bumpy, dusty drive, and only reached our destina-
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tion after searching for the address and taking several wrong 
turnings. 
I was swept off my feet as I entered, welcomed by a sea of 
eager, smiling faces, at least a hundred people who had come 
from many parts of Java to take part in the re-union. YPKP has 
grown in the fifteen months since its inception in April 1999 
into an organisation with scores of branches in almost every 
province. Its prime purpose is to investigate the killings in each 
locality, by seeking to ascertain the number of people slaugh-
tered and the way in which they died, as well as monitor the 
violations of people's civil rights. Investigations have been 
standardised; local groups use a questionnaire of thirty ques-
tions for each resource person, witnesses, relatives of victims. 
Village documents are also scrutinised for what they can reveal 
about the number of deaths. The groups always inform the 
local authorities of their activities and seek their collaboration 
though official endorsement is often not forthcoming . 
It was wonderful to see plenty of young faces in the audience. 
Sitting by my side was Dr Ribka Tjiptaning, a member of the 
financial team. She has written a book entitled, Saya bangga 
menjadi anak PKI [I'm proud to be a PK.I daughter] but has not 
yet found a publisher. 
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The YPKP has unleashed a new spirit among tens of thou-
sands of people, many of them former political prisoners, who 
for years have suppressed their anger over past sufferings. The 
foundation provides a meeting place and gives them a sense of 
purpose in a society that is riddled with groups still promoting 
anti-communist sentiments. Many former prisoners still hide 
their past from their families, workmates or neighbours. They 
shun the idea of joining political parties or creating their own 
parties. But as Ibu Sulami has said on many occasions, the 
YPKP 'is not a mass organisation or political movement. It is a 
research foundation whose aim is to collect data about victims.' 
YPKP is soon to host Danielle Mitterand, widow of the French 
president and director of France Libertes, on a visit to 
Indonesia, which is likely to raise the organisation's pro-file at 
home and abroad. Mme Mitterand is a great admirer of Ibu 
Sulami and the work she is doing. 
The dark side of Bali 
One of my most moving encounters took place on a one-day 
visit to Bali, at the invitation of the Bali branch of the YPKP. 
Here I was to witness the first efforts at gathering data about 
the massacre . 
Bali has a world reputation as a tourist attraction, mak-ing it 
better known than any other part of Indonesia, indeed than 
Indonesia itself. But there is a dark side to this tourists' 
paradise. It was in Bali that the post October 1965 massacres 
struck with an intensity unequalled anywhere in the country. 
The death toll in Bali, with a population of around four million, 
was at least 80,000 people although some put the figure much 
higher. I was quickly made aware that behind the facade of a 
rich culture, the dance, the gamelan, wood carvings and paint-
ings laid on in spectacular exhibitions for foreigners, the 
trauma left by the killings 35 years ago still grips many 
communities. 
At a meeting in the morning held to try to understand why 
the trauma had lasted so long, the discussion was largely domi-
nated by a man whose father, Sutedja, was governor of Bali in 
1965. In late 1965 he was summoned to Jakarta by President 
Sukarno who re-affirmed his appointment against the wishes 
of Suharto who wanted him removed. After attending several 
meetings of state organs, he was taken from his home in July 
1966 by four uniformed men and has never been seen since. 
None of the letters the son has written to the authorities seek-
ing information about his father has been answered. He is still 
a 'missing person'. 
My host in Denpasar was a former prisoner who spent ten 
years on the prison labour camp in Buru, for much of the time 
sharing a barrack with the novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 
When I admired his beautiful garden, he said he was putting to 
good use some of the skills he learnt in Buru. 
In a covered space which opened onto his garden, opposite 
the family temple (most Balinese are Hindus, have their own 
temples and make offerings to the gods daily), about fifty 
people gathered to talk in public about their own experiences 
of the massacre. For many, said my host, this was the first time 
that they would be speaking out like this. 
One witness who was 20 years old at the time calmly told us 
how he had been arrested and held in a large cell by the mili-
tary, 52 people in all, mostly members of mass or-ganisations 
from nearby villages. Every few days, a batch of men was 
taken out, their hands tied behind their backs and driven off to 
be shot. Only two of the prisoners sur-vived. In his own case, 
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this was because an uncle in the army secured his release. The 
witness said he knows where the victims were shot and buried. 
Another witness, an ethnic Chinese Indonesian, gave testi-
mony about the killing of 103 people, some as young as 15 . 
They were all inhabitants of Karang Asem, a village in East 
Bali . In this case, the people were not arrested but simply taken 
from their homes and killed, as their names were ticked off a 
list. Several people survived simply because their names had 
on Muslims, and Poncke Princen, also an adviser as well as an 
ex-prisoner. Poncke is frail in health and unable to walk un-
aided, his speech impaired by several strokes. (Difficult as it 
was for him to get around, he came to many of my meetings 
and was thrilled that one of my very first visits was to his 
home, to pay tribute to a man who set up Indonesia's very first 
human rights organisation in the late 1970s.) 
Another of KAPTN's members is Colonel Latief, who was a 
member of the trio of army officers who 
launched the kidnap action on 1 October 
1965. At his trial in 1977, he accused 
Suharto of involvement because, hours 
before the kidnapping, he informed the 
general of what was about to happen. It 
was painful to watch as he struggled to ex-
press himself, having been stricken several 
years ago by a stroke. He was one of the 
many people who insisted that Suharto 
should stand trial for crimes against 
humanity. [See box] 
The present government has done little 
to lessen the discrimination against ex-
prisoners. The president's call for MPRS 
Decree No XXV/1966 to be revoked has 
no chance of success in the present MPR. 
This decree outlawed the PK.I and made it 
illegal to disseminate Marxist teachings. 
---------- Even the decision announced last January by 
Carmel Budiardjo in a workshop on West Papua held in Jakarta on 14-16 July 2000 Wahid to re-store citizenship rights to 
inadvertently been overlooked or 'forgotten'. 
In Bali where the conflict between the PK.I and the PNI, the 
nationalist party, was intense, a PNI militia force known as 
tameng joined forces with the army to kill people. By 1965, 
Bali was a PK.I stronghold and peasants, women's and youth 
organisations were present everywhere. By the time the 
killings had lost momentum in August 1966, all local PK.I and 
organisation committees down to the lowest level has been 
decimated. 
Were there any attempts to stop the killings, I asked. Yes, said 
one woman. 'In our village, as the killings gathered pace, the 
population decided to prevent any more villagers from being 
taken away, and it worked,' she said. 
The notorious commander of the elite force, known then as 
RPKAD, Sarwo Edhie, had come to Bali in late 1965 to set the 
killer campaign going. Later he is reported to have been so 
shocked at how far things went that he ordered his men to stop. 
Defending ex-prisoners and victims 
Komite Aksi Pembebasan Tapol/Napol, KAPTN, Action 
Committee for the Release of Convicted and Unconvicted 
Prisoners, has campaigned for years on behalf of prisoners and 
their families. It now focuses primarily on pressing for the 
removal of civil rights restrictions on ex-prisoners and for their 
complete rehabilitation. Their office, located on a noisy thor-
oughfare, consists of a few poky rooms with the bare minimum 
of equipment. Gustaf Dupe who heads KAPTN was once a 
prisoner himself and stands out among an array of human 
rights activists who, since the 1980s, have supported prisoners 
and their families. KAPTN works on behalf of many genera-
tions of prisoners, going back to 1965. Attending our meeting 
was Ir Sanusi, an adviser to the board, who received two 
concurrent prison sentences during the mid 1980s crackdown 
hundreds of Indonesians still living as exiles 
abroad has been put on ice because law minister, Yusril Ihza 
Mahendra, now says that the present political climate is 'not 
conducive' to such a move. 
Although KAPTN supports the idea of revoking Decree 
XXV, it recently warned Gus Dur not to act precipitately for 
fear of rallying conservative forces opposed to such a move. 
There are several discriminatory ministerial regulations which 
the cabinet could and should repeal. This is where our two 
organisations can work together. 
Spanning the generations, KAPTN has several young people 
on its board. In charge of finances (of which they have very 
little) is Waskito, the son of Brig.General Sutarto, former head 
of the state intelligence agency under Sukarno who serve 30 
years in prison. Waskito was kind enough to help the rest of us 
understand what Latief was saying. 
Another group working to promote the interests of the victims 
of New Order crimes is Paguyuban Korban Orde Baru 
(Association ofVictims of the New Order). It has a very differ-
ent brief from the YPKP and aims to help victims take legal 
action to end the discrimination or violations of their human 
rights from which they are still suffering. Pakorba was set up 
in June 1999 and in the first year of its existence has already 
received no fewer than five thousand complaints that are 
substantial enough to be taken to court. The problem they face 
is raising the money to pay court expenses though lawyers 
would give their services free. 
Many of the cases involve former government employees who 
were dismissed in 1965 or thereafter without their dismissal 
status ever being formalised. Their salaries and pension rights 
were stopped without regard to proper pro-cedures. Others 
who were held as political prisoners without trial for many 
years returned home to find that their land or other property 
had been seized by neighbours or military officers without 
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compensation. Former prisoners still suffer discrimination as a 
result of the continuance in force of ministerial regulations 
imposing restrictions on them. 
Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa has also supported many initiatives 
supporting victims of the 1965 massacre. However, SNB's 
primary focus is racist discrimination and it is campaigning 
hard, with very well-documented publications, for all racist 
regulations to be revoked. This very impressive group which 
was set up after the anti-Chinese riots in May 1998 gave me a 
very warm welcome. 
Ex air force chief nails Suharto's lies 
Air Marshal Omar Dani, released from prison in 1995 after 
30 years, like so many others I met, has one mission in life, to 
expose the lies fabricated by Suharto. I met him at his invita-
tion with several of his former air force col-leagues in a rather 
grand old house, the walls bedecked with photos of Sukarno, 
of the men he commanded, the planes he flew and of himself 
Former Air Force Chief Omar Dani 
in uniform prior to October 1965. The book he has co-authored 
with other air force retirees is entitled Menyingkap Kabut 
Halim, (Dispelling the Fog over Halim.) 
It argues that the propaganda war that followed the events of 
1 October 1965 had as one of its aims to implicate the air force 
in the coup attempt. As a result, it is still widely believed that 
the well down which the murdered generals bodies were 
thrown, in Lubang Buaya, where para military training had 
also taken place, was located inside the air force base, Halim 
Perdanakusumah. This was deliberately confused with an area 
inside the base, also called Lubang Buaya, several kilometres 
away from the village of that name in Pondok Gde where the 
well and training base were located. The training there, mostly 
involving members of Jeftwing youth organisations, was Jed by 
an air force officer, Major Sudjono, who disregarded an order 
by his superiors to stop the training. (He was later sentenced to 
death and executed.) 
The rivalry between sections of the army and the air force 
goes back a Jong time before 1965, primarily, according to 
Omar Dani, because the air force strongly supported Sukarno 
and had been substantially equipped by arms deals with the 
Soviet Union. Suharto, then com-mander of the army's strate-
gic command, KOSTRAD, deeply resented Sukarno's decision 
to appoint Omar Dani to command the theatre of war set up to 
confront the British during konfrontasi. He sabotaged the 
dispatch of troops, even, according to Omar Dani, to the extent 
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of try-ing to have a Hercules plane that was flying in reinforce-
ments to Kalimantan shot down. (It is well known that 
Suharto's chief intelligence agent, Ali Murtopo, was in secret 
negotiations with British intelligence in Singapore, months 
before October 1965, to sabotage konfrontasi in preparation for 
Suharto's eventual seizure of power.) 
Omar Dani plans to publish his own memoir later this year, 
adding to the wealth of literature re-writing the history of 1965. 
At the launching of a book jointly published by TAPOL and 
Solidamor which includes a number of well-known articles 
about 1965 and entitled: Plot TN! AD - Barat Dibalik Tragedi 
'65, I focused my talk on the role of British intelligence in 
support of Suharto both before October 1965 and during the 
massacre. I highlighted the activities of Britain's MI6 based in 
Singapore to disseminate information discrediting Sukarno 
and the PKI as the massacres were underway. The British 
government knew very well what was happening and actually 
encouraged the killings. 
I got the impression from my discussion with 
Omar Dani that his experiences with Suharto during 
konfrontasi could shed new light on the Suharto-UK 
connection. 
Interest in the 1965 events was everywhere huge 
and I gave three radio interviews with phone-ins (on 
one occasion, a two-hour programme) that were 
inundated with calls. 
Human Rights Courts legislation 
I devoted much time to discussing the human 
rights courts draft bill which was submitted to the 
Indonesian parliament, the DPR, in June. Several 
NGOs in Jakarta were following the issue very 
closely including the Legal Aid Institute with whom 
I had several meetings. They invited me to join them 
in a hearing of Commission I of the DPR which I 
did. I raised TAPOL's objections to many aspects of 
the bill and submitted our comments on the draft. 
Some NGOs that had been invited decided not to attend, feel-
ing that their presence would only legitimise later claims that 
the DPR had held consultations whereas they did not believe 
that members would really pay attention. 
Although many groups had closely studied the draft bill and 
written up detailed comments, few had much optimism about 
the end result. The critical aspects of the bill involve the inclu-
sion of crimes against humanity to conform with international 
humanitarian Jaw as distinct from Indonesia's Criminal Code 
which does not include such crimes. The key to dealing with 
past crimes against humanity is the inclusion of an article 
enabling the establishment of ad hoc courts to try grave human 
rights violations committed under Suharto's New Order, 
putting aside the principle of non-retroactivity. The feeling of 
pessimism proves to have been warranted as the first annual 
session of the upper chamer, the MPR, adopted an amendment 
to the Indone-sian Constitution which states: ' .. the right not to 
be charged on the basis of retroactivity is a basic human right 
that may not be breached under any circumstances'. 
Thanks 
I am deeply grateful to Solidamor for their help and support in 
organising my itinerary. Special thanks to Tri Agus who 
patiently accompanied me through out the four weeks of my 
visit. He gallantly put up with mymoods and never-ending 
requests. Without him I would have been totally lost * 
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TNl-backed militias murder UNHCR workers 
TNI-backed militias in West Timor murdered three foreign UNHCR workers in Atambua, forcing 
the agency and all other foreign agencies to evacuate, leaving tens of thousands of East Timorese 
refugees in West Timor at the merer, of the militias. Desp_ite promises by Jakarta to end the refugee 
crisis in West Timor, the militias still reign supreme with evident support from the army. 
The three UN High Commission for Refugees officials 
were killed in a savage attack on the agency's office in 
Atambua, near the border with East Timor, on 6 September. 
Other foreign and local staff made a hazardous escape by scal-
ing surrounding walls. The three murdered men were dragged 
from the office, hacked and burned to death. The tragedy was 
condemned by UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako 
Ogata as 'the worst security incident ever to face the UNHCR'. 
The killing in Atambua coincided with the opening of the 
UN Millennium Summit in New York. A one-minute silence 
and angry denunciations of the killings by Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan, President Clinton and other world leaders came as 
a huge humiliation for President Abdurrahman Wahid who was 
attending the Summit. However, he barely mentioned the 
tragedy in his own statement the following day. In her state-
ment to the Summit, Ogata complained bitterly that there had 
been more than one hundred attacks on her staff in West Timor 
over the past year. 
Two weeks before the murders, the UNHCR suspended its 
operations in West Timor after three of its personnel were 
attacked and badly wounded, but decided to resume operations, 
after getting renewed assurances of security from the 
Indonesians, just days before the Atambua killings. In the 
event, Indonesian police did nothing to halt the attack on the 
agency's office, but stood by watching. 
The agency plays a crucial role in supplying the refugees 
with food and medical supplies and speeding up the repatria-
tion of the tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees still 
stranded in dozens of camps throughout West Timor. However, 
the sequence of attacks on their personnel reveals that the mili-
tias and their backers are bent on driving all non-Indonesian 
personnel out of West Timor, giving themselves free rein and 
using the refugee camps as a base from which to threaten the 
security of East Timor. The remaining refugees are in effect 
hostages to a strategy to destabilise East Timor devised by 
hard-liners in the Indonesian army. 
Although more than 100,000 refugees have been repatri-
ated since late last year, repatriation has recently fallen to a 
trickle. There have been numerous reports of threats and intim-
idation by militias in the camps, hampering the activities of the 
aid agencies in West Timor. [See article in TAPOL Bulletin, No 
158, June 2000] 
While it is not possible to identify the TNI officers who are 
backing the militias, the regional commander in Denpasar, 
Major-General Kiki Syahnakri, whose command covers West 
Timor, must at the very least be held responsible for doing 
nothing to disarm and disband the militia gangs. In a letter to 
the Foreign Office on 7 September, TAPOL called for his 
dismissal. There are reports of Kopassus soldiers being present 
and their former commander, Prabowo Subianto is known to 
have visited West Timor. 
The murderous attack on the UNHCR happened the day 
after a notorious militia leader, Olivio Mendoza Moruk, 
recently named as a suspect in forthcoming trials on East 
Timor, was killed. His body was paraded in the streets of 
Atambua by machete-wielding men calling for the UNHCR to 
get out of West Timor. It was in this frenzied atmosphere that 
the UN office was attacked. 
Olivio was leader of the Laksaur militia gang which attacked 
a church in Suai, East Timor last September, killing three priests 
and scores of villagers. On the day of Olivio's murder, thousands 
of people were gathered across the border in Suai to commemo-
rate the first anniversary of the Suai massacre. 
Within hours of the Atambua killings, there were reports 
that eleven people were massacred in a nearby village, 
confirming fears that a militia reign of terror may now sweep 
across West Timor. 
The security and already dire living conditions of the 
refugees can only get worse. However, the UNHCR have made 
it absolutely clear that they will not contemplate returning to 
West Timor until Indonesia takes positive action to disarm, 
disband and remove the militias; verbal guarantees from 
Jakarta will no longer be acceptable. 
Suspects named for East Timor trials 
Olivio was one of three militia leaders named as suspects 
by a team of the attorney-general's office in forthcoming trials 
in Indonesia about grave human rights violations in East 
Timor. Altogether 19 suspects were listed, considerably fewer 
than the 33 persons named by Indonesia's Special Investigation 
Commission (KPP HAM) in January. The name of General 
Wiranto who was identified by the Commission as being 
responsible for the failure of the Indonesian armed forces to 
safeguard security during the plebiscite, was the most conspic-
uous absentee. The other missing name is Major-General 
Zacky Anwar Makarim, the high-ranking intelligence officer 
who played a crucial role master-minding the militia mayhem 
during the months leading up to the UN-conducted referendum 
on 30 August. 
Other names left out from the 33 names recommended by 
the Commission are two top-ranking militia leaders. One is 
Eurico Guterres who led the Aitarak militia gang responsible 
for many atrocities in and around Dili. Eurico is now living in 
style in Kupang, West Timor, and acting as conduit for much of 
the financial support going to the militias. Astonishing as it 
may seem, Eurico is a trusted member of Megawati's PDI-P 
party and was responsible for security at the party's congress 
earlier this year. The other militia leader absent from the list is 
Joao Tavares, the notorious commander of the Halilintar mili-
tia gang. 
The most senior officer named is Major-General Adam 
Damiri who was the military commander based in Bali with 
overall command of East Timor and who is known to have been 
responsible for arming and financial the militia units. 
continued on page 21 
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Renewed violence threatens West Papua 
In early August, the Indonesian armed forces dispatched thousands of additional troops to West Papua 
amid signs that the policy of the central government towards the territory has gone into re-verse. The 
arrival of these troops created an atmosphere of tension and fear after months of hoping that the 
people's aspirations for a change in West Papua's status might be resolved by dialogue. Within weeks, 
three people had been shot dead for raising the Papuan flag. 
Since December 1999, President Abdurrachman Wahid has 
been trying to placate West Papuan aspirations. He announced 
a decision during a visit to Jayapura on New Year's Eve that 
the territory would now be known as Papua, not Irian Jaya. He 
also gave tacit support for a congress on West Papua's future by 
donating money. Although his concessions fell far short of 
acknowledging that the status of West Papua might change, it 
gave heart to people that dialogue and understanding would 
now be the path pursued by Jakarta. 
When the top military and police chiefs were replaced in 
November, a new hearts-and-minds policy called a 'policy of 
affection' was announced and the flying of the Papuan 
'Morning Star' flag was allowed as an expression of people's 
aspirations, as long as it was flown side by side with, and a 
little lower than, the Indonesian flag. However, while flag-rais-
ing was allowed in some places, elsewhere it provoked violent 
crackdowns as in Timika at the beginning of December when 
troops opened fire and killed one person, and in Nabire earlier 
this year when several people were killed. The conflicting poli-
cies were so confusing that a judge presiding over the trial in 
Sorong of a group of flag-raisers decided to acquit the accused 
as he was not sure which of the policies was the official one. 
Para-military forces have also emerged on both sides of the 
political divide. Since the holding of the Second Papuan 
Congress (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 158, June 2000), thousands 
have joined Satgas Papua, the security force that successfully 
guarded the congress without official interfer-ence. Local 
groups, mostly armed with traditional weapons, have sprung 
up in many places and were criticised in early August for their 
attempts to prevent Malukan refugees from entering West 
Papua [see separate article]. At the same time, a pro-
Indonesian para-military group known as Satgas Merah-Putih, 
or Red-and-White militia (named after the colours of the 
Indonesian flag), has also emerged. People on the ground fear 
that the policy of using militias which caused such devastation 
in East Timor last year is now being applied in West Papua, an 
order to provoke horizontal conflicts. 
TNI victory at the MPR changed things 
The most significant result of the Annual Session of 
Indonesia's supreme legislative assembly, the MPR, which was 
held in August was the change in the balance of forces between 
civil society and the military, with the latter coming out the 
stronger. Amid widespread public condemnation, the MPR 
agreed to allow the TNI, the Indonesian armed forces, to retain 
seats in the body until 2009 and granted amnesty to senior 
military officers and Suharto for past crimes against humanity 
committed during the New Order, including those committed 
in West Papua. But these decisions are only part of the reversal 
signalled by the MPR session. At its core is the fact that hard-
liners within the TNI are again in the ascendant, with grave 
implications for the situation in places like West Papua and 
Aceh where Wahid's softly-softly approach towards 'sepa-
ratism' had taken hold. 
An MPR decision to grant special autonomy to Irian Jaya has 
angered West Papuans who had been led to believe that such an 
issue would first be discussed in West Papua as one of two 
options, the other being independence. Wahid's proposal to call 
Irian Jaya Papua was also ignored, and the prospects for more 
dialogue now appear to have been shelved. 
The news that thousands of additional troops were pouring in 
to West Papua, happening as it did while the MPR session was 
still underway, was the most telling sign that a policy change 
was underway. According to sources in West Papua as well as 
Indonesia's TN/ Watch!, three battalions from Kostrad, the 
army's strategic command, have been sent to West Papua. A 
battalion consists of be-tween seven and eight hundred men, so 
this is the equivalent of around two thousand men. In addition, 
1, 700 Brimob troops have also arrived; this is the mobile 
brigade police force that has become widely feared for its 
brutality in many places. This adds up to at least 3,700 extra 
troops, besides the territorial troops. 
These non-organic troops are concentrated mainly in 
Jayapura, Merauke and Timika, with smaller detachments 
spread in most other districts. According to human rights 
activists, the troop arrivals caused consternation everywhere. 
'Our phones have never been so busy,' a human rights activist 
told TAPOL on 15 August. A large force has been sent to 
Timika for the express purpose of protecting the Freeport/Rio 
Tinto gold and copper mine. 
Three shot dead in Sorong 
The policy of allowing the Papuan flag to be unfurled has also 
been reversed. The first major crackdown came in Sorong on 
the western tip of West Papua, on 22 August. About sixty 
people from a nearby island arrived in Sorong the day before 
and unfurled the Papuan flag early next morning at the Imanuel 
Church. Two companies of Brim ob troops arrived on the scene 
at 8.30am and ordered the flag to be pulled down. When the 
flag raisers refused, the police opened fire without any warn-
ing shots. Although the Papu-ans tried to fight back, they were 
quickly forced to retreat as the firing continued. A number of 
people escaped by jumping into the sea. Three men were shot 
dead and twelve people were taken to hospital, all but one with 
bullet wounds. 
For months now, people have responded to the more relaxed 
policy by flying the Morning Star everywhere. In some 
districts, the flag is flying on every home. Flag-flying has a 
deep significance for West Papuans, an expression of their 
identity and carrying the conviction that this symbolic act will 
bring independence. With flag-raising now such a widely prac-
tised phenomenon, such peaceful actions are likely to become 
the flash-points for a crackdown. 
continued on page 24 
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IMPUNITY 
Suharto and TNI win immunity from MPR 
Just as the world was congratulating the Chilean people for their success in getting Pinochet's im-
munity removed, paving the way for a trial in a domestic court, Indonesia's armed forces "!anag~d to 
'persuade' the MPR to grant it immunity and impunity from any trials for grave human rights viola-
tions. This is a serious setback for justice and democracy. 
The first Annual Session of the MPR, Indonesia's supreme 
legislative chamber met in August, amid a battle royal between 
the political parties for a share of power and an unseemly fight 
over cabinet posts. But while that battle was raging, scant 
attention was given to scores of amend-ments to the Indonesian 
Constitution under discussion, especially those relating to the 
role of the military. Halfway through the session, it became 
apparent that a decision would be taken to retain uncontested 
seats in the MPR for the armed forces (TNI) and the police till 
2009 although leaders of the main parties had committed 
themselves to a cut-off date of 2004 (even that would have 
been a betrayal of the reform agenda so eagerly anticipated 
when Abdur-rachrnan Wahid took over the reins of government 
in October 1999). The argument, the public was told, was that 
since members of the security forces had surrendered their 
right to vote in general elections, they could legitimately insist 
on uncontested seats. But worse was still to come. 
Written into the Constitution 
Next came the disclosure that the role of the TNI would be 
written into the Constitution as the state organ solely responsi-
ble for 'defending, protecting and safeguarding state integrity 
and sovereignty.' Not even under Suharto was this established 
as a constitutional right although, to be fair, it wasn't really 
necessary; he would never have sur-vived had he not given 
ABRI, as the security forces were then called, a special role in 
security and political affairs . Nor did Suharto want the 'sacred' 
1945 Constitution to be tampered with or amended. 
As human rights advocates have argued, if no limit is placed 
on the role of the TNI, it could return the military to the 
national political stage, the very ones who com-mitted so many 
human rights violations. Such a blanket endorsement of the TNI 
role could moreover shatter confidence in many parts of the 
country, leading to the disintegration which the present govern-
ment is so set against. It also provides the judicial basis for the 
TNI to declare a state of emergency as it deems fit, in the inter-
ests of 'safeguarding (the state's) integrity and sovereignty'. 
But then, two days before the session ended when all that 
remained was the final plenary session, it became clear that 
another amendment would establish the principle that 'the right 
not to be charged on the basis of retroactivity is a basic human 
right that may not be breached under any cir-cumstances'. As 
Munir of Kontras, the Commission for the Disappeared and to 
Combat Violence, said on learning of this, non-retroactivity is 
indeed a universal principle. 'But this amendment will make it 
impossible to try perpetrators of human rights which occurred in 
the past, specifically by the military,' he said. It is widely acknowl-
edged under international humanitarian law that exceptions can 
and should be made in cases of gross violations of human rights 
which were the hallmark of Suharto's 32-year New Order. 
When Munir challengedAmien Rais, the speaker of the MPR 
to reconsider these amendments, he was told: 'Unfortunately, 
you came when the food has already been served.' Rais even 
admitted that leaders of the assembly's Commission A assigned 
to discuss the amendments were 'people with little knowledge 
on legal and human rights issues' . [Jakarta Post, 17 August 
2000) 
Call for an international tribunal 
In June, the Wahid government submitted a draft human 
rights courts law to the DPR which would, if enacted, es-tablish 
human rights instruments as a part of Indonesian law. It 
includes an article enabling the creation of ad hoc courts to 
apply these instruments for specific cases in the past. The 
constitutional amendment means that that paragraph becomes 
indefensible. It means that, insofar as hu-man rights violators are 
brought to court, they will only be charged with ordinary crimes 
under the Criminal Code. The widely condemned koneksitas trial 
in Aceh earlier this year (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 158, June 
2000) is now more than likely to become the norm. 
A month later, more than a hundred organisations and indi-
viduals wrote to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, calling for 
the Security Council to set up an international tribunal for 
crimes against humanity in East Timor before and after last 
year's ballot. The letter said: '... we have concluded that 
progress (in creating a court in Indonesia) has not been satis-
factory and that international standards of justice will not 
prevail in Indonesia for some considerable time ... The main 
obstacles to the speedy completion of the Indonesian process 
are the lack of political will in certain quarters to ensure the 
process succeeds, the serious flaws in the human rights courts 
bill now before the Indonesian Parliament, and the poor calibre 
of judicial personnel.' As recent developments have shown, this 
was a gross understatement. 
There has been deep disappointment and outrage in Indonesia 
at the MPR's decision which is bound to grow in the months to 
come. The issue is by no means over. If the UN does indeed set 
up an international tribunal, the powers that be in Indonesia 
will need to reconsider things. As events have shown, the 
Indonesian Constitution is now no longer regarded as sacro-
sanct. Calls are being made for a Constitutional Commission to 
draft a new constitution. It will be up to civil society to bring 
this about and force a revision of the dangerous concessions 
granted to the TNI during the MPR's inglorious 2000 Session. 
* 
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PEASANTS 
Peasants arrested for demanding land 
In many parts of Indonesia, communities which lost land rights and suffered other violations during 
the Suharto dictatorship are now seeking redress. A struggle for the restoration of land rights has been 
underway in South Sumatra since early this year and has landed fifteen demonstrators in po-lice 
custody since July. Four activists calling for an agrarian law were abducted in Jakarta and a strike at 
a coal mine in East Kalimantan has shut down production for weeks. 
The struggle in South Sumatra involves 22,000 hectares of 
land seized in 1988 by three companies, two privately owned 
and one state company. The seized land was converted into 
plantations and the land-owners were given no say in the 
amount of compensation paid, nor where they given plots of 
land in the areas attached to the plantations known as plasma. 
Altogether 856 peasant families were affected by the land seizure. 
Many injured when police open fire 
During an action on 20 July this year, the peasants took their 
grievance to the local government administration of Muara 
Enim, South Sumatra. Altogether eight hundred people from 
several villages took part in the action. They demanded a meet-
ing with an administration official to present their demands 
but were kept waiting without knowing whether they would be 
received. Then, after demanding to see someone within half an 
hour, someone in the crowd threw a brick at the office which 
broke a window. The police responded by opening fire and 
wounding a large num-ber of demonstrators. A pedicab driver 
unconnected with the action who happened to be standing 
nearby was killed. Dozens of people had to be rushed to hospi-
tal, six of whom had serious bullet wounds. 
A press release issued by Serikat Tani Nasional, (STN), the 
National Peasants' Union on 20 July, said that after warning 
shots were fired into the air, the police began to fire straight 
into the crowd. The firing continued even when the demon-
strators had turned and fled from the scene. The release 
suggests that the brick was thrown by a provocateur. 
Over a hundred people were taken into police custody, of whom 
fifteen are still being held. According to the latest information 
from the STN, the fifteen men, all peasants, will face charges 
under Article 1 70 of the Criminal Code for the collective use of 
violence, the maximum penalty for which is five and a half years. 
The men who were released from police custody after being 
held overnight described how they were all punched, kicked 
and treated with great brutality. One man in particular 
sustained serious injuries when he was pushed against a barbed 
wire fence, leaving a pool of blood on the floor of the cell. 
The action in July followed earlier actions in April and June 
this year. On 17 April, the peasants went to the office of PT 
Cipta Futura, one of the private companies involved in the land 
seizure, wanting to meet the management. They were blocked 
from getting near the building by soldiers. After talks with the 
troops, the action ended peacefully. Ten days later, on 27 April, 
the peasants went en masse to the local assembly to demand that 
they be given plots in the plasma section, in compensation for the 
land that had been seized. They had been given to understand two 
days earlier that the management of the company would meet 
them at the assembly on 27 April but nobody turned up. 
Frustrated by the failure of their efforts to resolve the dispute 
peacefully, the peasants announced their intention to occupy 
land that was now being used by the plantation company. 
Peasants from seven kampungs launched this action on 14 
June. A fierce conflict broke out after they were blocked by 
Pam Swakarsa para-militaries. During the course of this 
conflict, a company employee was killed though the protesters 
insist that they were not responsible for his death. 
Now fifteen men face serious charges because of their efforts to 
resolve a grave injustice which they suffered under the New Order. 
Four hunger-strikers disappear outside MPR 
Four men who were waging a hunger and speech strike in 
front of the MPR building while the MPR session was under-
way disappeared after being forcibly removed by a unit of 
Brimob, the notoriously tough wing of the Indonesian police. 
The action was aimed at highlighting the MPR's failure to 
discuss serious social issues and was calling for the country's 
top legislative organ to adopt a decree on agrarian reform. It 
began at midday on Monday, 14 August, halfway through the 
MPR's first annual session. Later that day, at 7.30pm, Brimob 
troops who were on duty to protect the MPR building, entered 
the area where the men were sitting, dragged them away and 
forced them into two waiting police ambulances. Later, secu-
rity sources claimed that the men were allowed to alight from 
the ambulances on one of Jakarta's main thoroughfares but 
nothing was heard from them for two weeks after their forced 
removal from the premises of the MPR. 
The wife of Usep Setiawan who heads an organisation, 
YP2AS, which advocates social change, told the press a week 
later that she had heard nothing from her husband since the 
evening before the action when he phoned to say he was on his 
way to Jakarta.[Kompas, 20 August 2000] The three other men 
involved in the hunger strike are all students at Pajajaran 
University, Bandung. 
StopPress: Two weeks after disappearing, the four men turned 
up by plane in Jakarta, with no idea where they had been 
taken. They were grabbed in a Jakarta street not long after 
alighting from the ambulances. They had been kept blindfolded 
and questioned about their campaign in favour of agrarian 
reform. Although they were all deeply traumatised by their 
experience, the police accused them of faking the whole thing 
to gain attention. 
Strike paralyses production at British-owned coal mine 
A two-month long strike at PT Kaltim Prima Coal (KPC) in 
East Kalimantan which was launched by members of SBSI, the 
Indonesian Prosperity Trade Union, in support of a fifteen per 
cent wage claim and better working conditions, led to a work-
ers' blockade following the company's decision to dismiss 
scores of workers for organising the strike. 
The strike commenced on 14 June but escalated a week later 
after the local labour arbitration board ruled that the strike was 
illegal. A group of workers then managed to occupy the mine 
but were forcibly removed by the local police, an action that 
led to 150 striking workers taking control of the company's 
chief mining facilities in Sangatta, East Kalimantan, forcing 
continued on page 3 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 159, August/September 2000 19 
REFUGEES 
Jakarta's refugee problelll unmanageable 
One grave problem facing Indonesia in the post-dictatorship period is the growing number of people 
who have been forced to flee their homes because of the explosion of violence. In particular the 
violence in Maluku and Aceh has created hundreds of thousands of refugees or 'internally displaced 
persons'. An overview of the refugee problem tells us a great deal about the many conflicts and acts of 
violence that have occurred in Indonesia during the post-Suharto period. 
Official figures for refugees are notoriously unreliable but 
they give an indication of the magnitude of the problem. The 
office of the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare esti-
mates that there are now 860,000 refugees, while the Indonesian 
Red Cross figure is at least 700,000. The Indonesian govern-
ment is overwhelmed by the situation and admits that, finan-
cially as well as logistically, the situation has become unman-
ageable. 
As soon as he assumed control of the government, Ab-durrach-
man Wahid abolished the social affairs ministry because it was 
so riddled with corruption. It is not clear which official body is 
now responsible for dealing with the refugee crisis. 
The Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare and Poverty 
Eradication, Basri Hasanuddin, deals with problem and so 
does Erna Witular, the minister for settlement and regional 
development, a new department created when Wahid took 
over. Both complain about the lack of funds. There is no special ~ 
budget for refugees and additional budgetary allocations from the 
department of finance take months to get approval, resulting in a 
logjam. 
The number ofrefugees who have arrived in North Sulawesi, 
mostly from Halmahera and Ambon, is around 30,000, and 
there is no end in sight to the influx. The food situation in the 
Kitawaya area, inhabited by refugees is abysmal. Since June, 
relief supplies from Jakarta have dried up and conditions have 
deteriorated. The only ones handling the crisis in Menado, 
North Sulawesi are local NGOs and religious organisations 
Regional administrations face the same problem, What so often 
happens is that they are suddenly inundated with a huge influx of 
people; temporary camps spring up, and the refugees have to be 
supplied with their most basic needs. Yet, usually the administra- Refugees from Acehnese villages 
tions have already used up their budget and additional money 
from Jakarta takes months to clear the many bureaucratic hurdles. 
A sorry state of affairs 
More and more reports about the appalling conditions in 
which the refugees live are appearing in the press. Only 
recently, the heart-rending experience ofrefugees from Ambon 
when they arrived at a port in West Papua aboard KM 
Dobonsolo was widely reported. Most of the 3,000 passengers 
were people desperate to leave the island of Ambon because of 
the conflict. Dozens had fled from the Christian village of 
Waai which had been attacked a few days earlier by Muslim 
militia groups. The entire village was razed to the ground and 
at least two dozen people were killed in this, the second attack 
on the village. When passengers tried to disembark in Sorong, 
they were rejected by local people. The ship then sailed Biak 
where the same thing happened, and finally it docked in 
Jayapura. Here too, the local administration and the newly set 
up Satgas Papua (Papua Militia) refused to allow the desper-
ate refugees to leave the ship. It was only after three days of 
heated discussion, with the refugees remaining on board, that 
they were finally allowed to disembark. The Jayapura-based 
NGO, ELS-HAM publicly denounced the attitude of both the 
local government and the Satgas Papua. 
In June an overcrowded ferry sailing from North Maluku to 
North Sulawesi sank in rough seas; 480 refugees drowned in 
the tragedy. The only ones to survive was a group of ten people 
including several youngsters who had clung to a raft for days. 
Their survival was little short of a miracle. 
who have done what they could to keep the refugee camps 
supplied with basic needs. 
The situation in camps elsewhere is at least as bad as in 
Menado. The tiny island of Buton in Southeast Sulawesi has 
had to take in no fewer than 100,000 refugees. The Buton 
islanders, all Muslims, have a long tradition of mi-gration. 
Tens of thousands of Butonese have migrated to central 
Maluku over the years, in particular to the island of Ambon. 
From 1950s onwards, Butonese settlements sprung up in prac-
tically all Ambonese towns and villages. The Butonese were 
the ones to take on the manual jobs, driving pedicabs, grow-
ing vegetables as well as becoming small traders in the market 
places. The Butonese were among the first victims of the 
conflict in Maluku. Practically all the Butonese were driven 
from their homes by Christian gangs and sent back to Buton in 
ships. Most are second or third generation Butonese for whom 
Buton is a place they heard about from their grandparents. 
Now they are back there, living in refugee camps in atrocious 
conditions with little prospect for a return to Ambon or for 
setting up home again in their former 'homeland'. 
Earlier waves of refugees 
The situation of refugees in West Timor has been most widely 
reported because of the international ramifications and its 
impact on the security situation in East Timor. Unlike any other 
refugee situation, the UN Security Council takes a close inter-
est and this is the only place where the UN High Commission 
for Refugees has become involved although their officials are 
frequently harassed and forced to halt their work because of the 
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presence of army-backed militias in the camps[see separate 
article]. 
Following the explosion of violence in East Timor in what 
has become known as Black September last year, after the 
results of the plebiscite were announced, hundreds of thou-
sands of East Timorese were forced to flee from their home-
land by the military and their proxies, the militia, and become 
unwilling refugees in West Timor. [See also TAPOL Bulletins 
No. 156 and 158]. Be-tween 100,000 and 150,000 East 
Timorese are still trapped in camps in West Timor, held hostage 
by various militia groups. So far, the Indonesian military and 
police have not been able (or are unwilling) to disarm the mili-
tia and arrest their leaders. Despite strong pressure from the 
UN and in-dividual countries and a host of promises from 
Jakarta, the Indonesian government has been unable to resolve 
the problem of refugees in West Timor. 
Nearly a year since that tragedy, many East Timorese villages 
are being reconstructed and rehabilitated. The longer the refugees 
remain in West Timor, the more difficult it will be for them to be 
absorbed back into their former villages. Sources close to the 
military now claim that the refugees will be sent back once East 
Timor has become independent, creating a huge problem for the 
new-born state in coping with 100,000 homeless people. 
West Kalimantan and Aceh 
The bloody conflict that flared up in December 1996 in West 
Kalimantan between Dayaks and Madurese resulted in a wave 
ofMadurese fleeing their homes [see also TAPOL Bulletin No. 
139, February 1997]. According to the Indonesian Red Cross, 
16,293 Madurese refugees are still living in camps in Sambas, 
Pontianak and Singkawang while another 14,798 Madurese 
have returned to Bangkalan, Madura, where they are being 
housed temporarily in camps. 
The problem of refugees in Aceh dates back to 1989 when 
6,000 Indonesian troops were deployed in a military offensive 
against GAM, the Aceh Liberation Front. Thousands of innocent 
people were killed, disappeared, tortured and raped. Thousands 
more fled to neighbouring Malaysia, while others went into 
hiding in the mountains. Aceh was declared a military opera-
tional zone (DOM, Daerah Op-erasi Militer) which remained in 
force until August 1998. Many of the Acehnese refugees have not 
returned home, and have remained in Malaysia. A small number 
have been given asylum in various parts of the world, including 
Scan-dinavian countries, the USA, Canada and Australia. No 
reliable figures are available of the Acehnese diaspora, in partic-
ular the ones who left during the DOM period. 
Since DOM was lifted, a new political situation has arisen 
but violence continues unabated. [See also TAPOL Special 
Report: A Reign Of Terror, Human Rights Violations in 
Aceh 1998 - 2000]. Military operations have continued and as 
always, civilians have become the victims. Unidentified groups 
and persons have attacked and burned schools and government 
buildings. During the past two years, thousands of refugees 
have left their villages in circumstances that are largely the 
same. Reports of military 'sweepings' in an area spread a 
climate of fear. Often, an entire village will leave as soon as 
violence erupts. During 1998 and 1999, hundreds of thousands 
of Acehnese left their villages but the number of people flee-
ing nowadays is much less though it has continue~ to happen 
even after the accord on a Humanitarian Pause was mtroduced. 
Often mosques and schools are used to provide temporary 
shelter for the refugees. It frequently happens that, after a few 
weeks, the people decide to return to their villages once they 
REFUGEES 
are assured that the military operations have stopped. 
According to the Indonesian Red Cross, the number of refugees 
in Aceh is currently 2I ,179. Unlike elsewhere in Indonesia, the 
number of refugees fluctuates both up and down. 
Maluku, by far the worst 
The Maluku archipelago covers a vast area from north to 
south but the worst violence has occurred on the islands of 
Ambon, Ternate and the northern part of the island Halmahera. 
The violence on these three islands has prompted a flow of 
refugees to many parts of Maluku as well as to the other islands. 
According to the Indonesian Red Cross on 31 July 2000, the 
number of refugees from Maluku was as follows: 
Ternate (North Maluku) 152,490 
Seram, Tuai, Buru (Central Maluku) 143,687 
West Papua 30,000 
Bitung (North Sulawesi) 30,000 
Buton (Southeast Sulawesi) 99,572 
continued from page 16 
However, his chief of staff, Mahidin Simbolon, whose role 
in promoting the militias is widely acknowledged, is not on the 
list. 
The list also includes the last two military commanders of 
East Timor: Tono Suratman and Nur Muis, and the last chief of 
police, Timbul Silaen, all of whom have been given promotions 
and new posts since Indonesia withdrew from East Timor, leav-
ing a trail of devastation and death. The most senior-ranking 
civilian suspect is Abilio Osorio Soares, the governor of East 
Timor. The other suspects are TNI officers who were in charge 
of three of the most bloodthirsty operations in East Timor in 
the months preceding the referendum, the massacre in Suai, the 
massacre at the home of Manuel Carrascalao in Dili on 17 
April, and the killings at the home of Bishop Belo on 5 
September. 
Although the suspects have been named, it is far from clear 
how or in which court they will be formally charged. Plans to 
set up ad hoc courts with powers to try past crimes against 
humanity have been undermined by the constitutional amend-
ment adopted in August by the MPR, disallowing retroactive 
charges. [See separate article.] This unexpected development 
almost certainly persuaded the attorney-general's team to 
exclude Wiranto from the list as it would not be possible for 
him to be charged under Indonesia's Criminal Code. 
According to Munir, a member of the KPP HAM, the death 
of Olivio Mendoza is a serious setback for the trials as he was 
expected to spill the beans about TNI officers in overall charge 
of the murderous campaign for which he would have been 
tried. He condemned the attorney-general's office for failing to 
give protection to suspects and witnesses, arguing that all the 
civilian suspects should be placed under protective custody for 
their own safety and to ensure the successful conduct of the 
trials. 
The wheels of justice are moving forward painfully slowly 
in Indonesia, leading many to believe that the only way is for 
the UN to set up an international tribunal. Scores of interna-
tional NGOs have written twice to the UN secretary-general 
since early July calling for a tribunal; following the events in 
Atambua, calls are growing, among others from the East 
Timorese leader, Xanana Gusmao, for the creation of an inter-
national war crimes tribunal. * 
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PRIOK MASSACRE 
Tanjung Priok revisited 
On 12September1984 a tragic bloodbath occurred in Tanjung Priok, the dockland district of Jakarta. 
A group of around 1,500 demonstrators were suddenly hemmed in from two directions by heavily-
armed troops. Responding to a signal, the troops started shooting at the crowd, hitting hundreds of 
people. Within minutes, dead bodies and wounded lay strewn all over the road. The Priok Massacre 
was the beginning of a ferocious witch hunt against Muslim activists. 
It took sixteen years and the overthrow of Suharto before it power. The victims of Priok became pariahs in society. The 
was possible to reopen the Tanjung Priok case. During 1985 road to obtain justice has been lengthy, painful and frustrating. 
more than 150 Muslims were tried, convicted and sentenced to Shortly before the end of the Suharto era, efforts were made 
heavy terms of imprisonment. Their mistakes were merely that by some TNI officers, notably former Jakarta military chief Lt. 
they had given sermons critical of the government, conducted General Hendro Pryono, to curry favour with some of the 
religious courses not approved by the authorities or produced victims' families by offering them money and jobs. Predictably, 
leaflets and journals denouncing government policy. Some were this split the group, leading to mutual recriminations, which 
charged in connection with terrorist attacks in which bombs had has added to the difficulties of the inquiry set up to investigate 
been thrown but the cases were never properly investigated. the case. 
As with all the other bloodbaths that occurred during the New The Priok case victimised many people, not only ordi-nary 
Order in any part of Indonesia, it started with an act of provo- Muslims whose families were devastated by the massacre but 
cation. The trouble began when army officers ordered people also public figures like the late Lt. General Dhar-sono, Ir. 
in a mushollah (a small prayer-house) to remove leaflets from Sanusi and A.M.Fatwa. All these men faced charges and were 
the wall. They had acted imprisoned in the after-
roughly in a house of worship math of the Priok 
and news spread that one of the Massacre. Fatwa has 
officers did not remove his now joined PAN, a new, 
boots before entering the inclusive Muslim party 
prayer-house. In response, that emerged in the 
many people gathered to post-Suharto era; he 
protest against the behaviour of was one of the most 
the officers. outspoken dissidents in 
Four mosque officials were the early eighties. Now 
arrested which only added to he is deputy chair of the 
the turmoil. And when the DPR, the Indonesian 
1,500 people marched to the parlia-ment, represent-
police headquarters on 12 ing PAN. He is one of 
September demanding the the few Priok victims to 
release of the mosque officials, Twenty eight Tanjung Priok victims on trial in 1985. Many were still suffering have been able to return 
they were met with a volley of from bullet wounds to public life. Sanusi, 
fire from troops who were who was given two 
present in large numbers. General Benny Murdani, then armed heavy sentences, has thrown in his lot with groups seeking 
forces commander in chief and head of the security agency, redress for the discrimination being suffered by victims of the 
KOPKAMTIB, and Major-General Try Sutrisno, then military New Order. 
commander of Jakarta, came to the scene to cover up the extent 
of the massacre, claiming that only nine people had died. 
In March and April 1985, 28 survivors of the massacre were 
tried for having taken part in the demonstration. They were 
accused of 'waging resistance with violence' against the armed 
forces and sentenced to up to three years imprisonment. 
Twenty-four of the defendants had been wounded in the 
massacre and some of the men in court were still too ill to 
stand. One of their lawyers, the human rights activist Poncke 
Princen, said at the time: 'Where is the logic if people who 
fired the shots are not punished but those who were shot are?' 
[For a detailed account of the charges against the 28 men and 
their sentences, see TAPOL Bulletin, No 69, May 1985.] 
Without a voice 
For sixteen years, the survivors and relatives of the victims 
never had the chance to raise their voice. Any discussion of the 
Priok case was taboo, comparable only to the taboo surround-
ing the 1965 massacre which took place as Suharto seized 
After pressure, inquiry team established 
The demand for justice in the post-Suharto period has been 
enormous forcing the transitional Habibie government to enact 
laws enabling the creation of commissions of inquiry into 
notorious human rights violations during the New Order. Most 
notable of these are the East Timar case, the 27 July attack on 
the POI HQ, the Marsinah (murdered trade unionist) case and 
the Tanjung Priok case. In all these cases, special commissions 
were set up by Komnas HAM, the National Human Rights 
Commission. After completing their investigations, the 
commissions are required to report back to Kornnas HAM 
which must decide whether the findings are substantial enough 
to be passed on to the At-tomey General's office for formal 
investigation, with a view to indicting the culprits. 
KP3T (Komisi Penyelidikan dan Pemeriksaan Pelanggaran 
HAM Tanjung Priok, Commission to Investigate the Human 
Rights Violations in Tanjung Priok) was set up in March this 
year and was required to complete its investigations within 
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three months. It consisted of nine members, chaired by Djoko 
Sugianto, the chair of Kornnas HAM. The role of Djoko 
Sugianto was compromised by the fact that he was on the panel 
of judges that convicted the 28 victims of the massacre in 1985. 
In the meantime several committees emerged claiming to 
represent the families of the victims. Mukhtar Beni Biki is the 
co-ordinator of the Priok victims while Ahmad Hambali co-
ordinates the KPKP (Koa/isi Pembela Kasus Priok, Coalition 
for the Defence of the Priok Case). 
Political background 
The Tanjung Priok killings occurred in 1984, when Suharto 
was doing his utmost to impose his 'final solution', destroying 
political plurality in Indonesian society. The aim of his policy 
was to force all citizens into the Panca-Sila (the state doctrine) 
mould. The law forcing all organisations to accept the state 
doctrine as their 'sole principle' was enacted in 1985 but prepa-
rations for this were already well underway when the Tanjung 
Priok Massacre occurred. The most vociferous opposition 
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A fundamentally flawed report 
On 12 June 2000, the KP3T produced a report which was 
later handed over to Marzuki Darusman, the Attorney General. 
From the outset, it was clear that the work of the commission 
was fundamentally flawed. There was no intention to find the 
real culprits, the men who planned the operation, and this is 
obvious from the findings . Unlike the East Timor inquiry, no 
names of officers were mentioned as being suitable for further 
investigated by the Attorney General. 
The KP3T report concludes that the Tanjung Priok blood bath 
resulted in 24 people being killed and another 36 sustaining 
heavy injuries. Eye witness accounts of the massacre tell a very 
different story. Some relate seeing army trucks driving bodies 
away and practically every family in the neighbourhood lost a 
relative. Human rights organisations have always insisted that 
hundreds of people lost their lives. 
Another shocking claim of the KP3T report was that there was 
no advance plan by the security forces to shoot at the demon-
strators . It even claims that the security officers were 
compelled to open fire because the demonstrating 
masses behaved in an unruly way and attacked them 
while at the same time destroying houses, shops, cars 
and a church. They were accused of trying to seize the 
weapon of a soldier and 'brutally' forcing the soldier 
to retreat, hence compelling him to open fire . 
Survivors deny that any such tussle occurred. They 
have graphically describe how the military received 
the command to shoot at the defenceless crowd. The 
demonstrators were also accused of committing a 
human rights violation by killing nine members of a 
Chinese family. Equating the army's planned opera-
tion with the murder of the family reveals the shal-
lowness of the in-quiry team's comprehension of 
human rights violations. The killing of the Chinese 
. . . . family has never been investi-gated. It was clearly an 
General. Benny Murdam, ~eft and Ma1or-General Try Sutnsno, right, the two ordinary, very brutal crime that should be treated as 
responsible men for the Prwk bloodbath such and not blamed collectively on the demonstrators. 
came from different strands of political Islam and it was no On 24 March, in the early stages of the inquiry, mem-bers of 
surprise that a witchhunt was launched against Muslim the KP3T visited the TNI HQ in Cilangkap to meet top offi-
activists. Despite the heavy press censorship, plenty of infor- cers. This in itself was a compromising encounter, which 
mation on the trials appeared in the press, making it possible explains why the meeting was never publicised. It seems that a 
for TAPOL to produce a 116-page book in 1987 entitled: deal was struck on how far the KP3T report should go: it could 
Indonesia: Muslims on Trial, analysing the background of reach the conclusion that serious human rights violations 
this witch hunt. We still believe that the Tanjung Priok occurred but should not incriminate senior TNI officers. A telling 
massacre was instigated and provoked by military intelligence feature of the findings is that they mirror the statement made after 
and that it signalled the start of an operation designed to the event by General Benny Murdani who alleged that the masses 
incriminate and victimise Muslim activism. behaved in such an unruly fashion as to give the security forces 
In many places in Java innocent Muslims were arrested. In no option but to open fire. [See report from AFP, dated 13 
Malang, East Java, people from a small Muslim congre-gation September 1984, quoted in TAPOL Bulletin, No 69, May 1995] 
were arrested. The same happened in Central Java where The human rights organisation, Kontras which represents one 
dozens of pious Muslims were simply taken from their homes of the Priok victim groups, was also very unhappy about legal 
in the middle of the night and charged with acts of subversion. aspects of the KP3T inquiry. Instead of basing its investiga-
TAPOL recorded 157 verdicts while dozens of other people tions on Presidential Decree, Perpu No.1/1999, which would 
were arrested and imprisoned with-out trial. have meant that its findings would be the legal base for further 
The Indonesian armed forces played a crucial role in the investigations to mount a formal indictment, it became a free 
implementation of this witch hunt. The commander-in-chief wheeling inquiry with no other clear purpose than to satisfy the 
was General Benny Murdani, a ruthless man with a long career public that the Priok case had been re-examined. 
in military intelligence. The Jakarta military chief was Major-
General Try Sutrisno, a staunch Suharto loyalist. The Priok 
bloodbath promoted his career; he later replaced Murdani as 
commander-in-chief and was subse-quently appointed vice-
president of the Republic. 
Mass graves not investigated 
Even more worrying is the way KP3T (mis)-handled the matter 
of mass graves and its attempts to determine the death toll . 
Although the team questioned about two hundred people, some 
crucial witnesses were not summoned. In particular, they failed 
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to question two important wit-nesses, Kemis and Marsudi. 
Kemis had dug a mass grave in Kramat Ganceng on the night of 
12 September 1984, while Marsudi, the village head of Pondok 
Rangon confi rmed the whereabouts of the grave. However, the 
team only took a statement from Abdul Madjid, the cemetery 
proprietor who denied the existence of a mass grave. 
Having done nothing to investigate reports about the disposal 
of a large number of bodies, the team's conclusion about the 
number of casualties, 23 dead and 36 injured, was based solely 
on the evidence of medical staff at the army hospital who can 
hardly be regarded as unbiased. 
From the way they conducted the investigations, it is clear 
that the KP3T members had no intention of discovering the 
truth about the death toll or the existence of mass graves. When 
General Try Sutrisno was questioned, three burial places were 
mentioned but the KP3T did not insist on taking a look at the 
graves. Another important clue, the possibility that more than 
300 bodies were air lifted on the night of the tragedy to Pulau 
Seri bu, a cluster of uninhabited islands in the Jakarta bay, was 
also ignored by the KP3T team because a crucial witness failed 
to tum up for questioning. The likelihood that he had been 
under pres-sure not to appear was apparently not considered. 
Marzuki Darusman returns the report 
After the KP3T findings were delivered by Kornnas HAM to 
the attorney general, Marzuki Darusman, Kornnas HAM held 
a press conference to announce the findings. All the victims 
and their families exploded in anger and accused the team of 
slandering the demonstrators, while Kontras was strongly crit-
ical of the findings. Munir said that in many respects , the find-
ings of the inquiry were identical with statements made at a 
press conference in 1984 given by the two generals involved in 
the matter, Murdani and Try Sutrisno. A few days later the 
office of Komnas HAM was attacked by several Muslim youth 
organisations and part of the interior was seriously damaged, 
including computers. On another occasion, the ground floor of 
the building was occupied, in protest at the Priok findings . 
Marzuki Darusman himself was not satisfied with the report 
and returned it to Kornnas HAM for several aspects to be 
further investigated. He mentioned in particular the question of 
the mass graves and the killing of the Chinese family which 
occurred when riots broke out in the vicinity of the demonstration. 
But in fact the most glaring omission of the report is its fail-
ure to dig deeper into the incident and seriously con-sider how 
it fitted in with the provocative activities of top-level state 
organs intent on criminalising Muslim groups for daring to 
voice their opposition to the regime's 'Panca-sila as the sole 
principle' policy. Unless this matter is addressed, the chances 
of justice ever being done with regard to the Tanjung Priok 
Massacre are remote. 
When Carmel Budiardjo met Kornnas HAM secretary-
general Nababan, during her recent visit to Jakarta, and 
pressed him on this, he threw up his hands and said: 'These are 
"intel" matters and we have no way of accessing such things.'* 
continued from page 17 . . 
On 15 August, several human rights orgamsat1ons and 
church leaders, including the Bishop of Jayapura, L~o Laba 
Ladjar and the heads of the two Protestant churches m West 
Papua, issued a wide-ranging statement warning _of the 
danger of conflict re-emerging, following the arnval of 
extra troops. It referred to plans by the security forces to 
initiate a Rajawali operation (no doubt, along the lines of 
Rajawali operations in Aceh) to persuade Papuans to tum 
away from thoughts about independence. 
It made a number of recommendations: ( 1) That the right 
of people to call themselves Papuans and the tradition of 
flag-raising should be acknowledged as their right to free-
dom of expression. (2) That the central and local govern-
ments should respect the principle of dialogue and do 
everything to prevent the re-emergence of militarism. For 
West Papua this means withdrawing all non-organic troops, 
as the use of violence can only create new problems. (3) 
That plans for regional autonomy should be shelved and the 
issue discussed with the Papuan people. ( 4) It also called 
upon all sections of society, in particular the Papuan 
Presidium Council (set up by the Second Papuan Congress 
in June this year), religious leaders, traditional leaders, 
Satgas Papua and Satgas Merah-Putih to focus on dialogue 
as the way to resolve conflict and to exercise the utmost re-
straint so as to avoid being trapped in a cycle of violence 
which can only lead to yet more bloodshed. * 
